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NOTE
The Uranium Cartel Saga

-

Yellowcake and Act

of State: What Will Be Their Eventual Fate?
by Raymond J. Pikna, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTIONt

O Nnounced
SEPTEMBER 8, 1975, Westinghouse Electric Corporation
that it could not meet its contractual obligations

anto supply
nuclear fuel to many purchasers of Westinghouse nuclear reactors.1 Westinghouse raised the "commercial impracticability" defense of section 2615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 arguing that the tremendous
increase in uranium prices was partly due to an international uranium
cartel.3 As John E. Moss observed,
There is no doubt now that a cartel existed. The controversy is over
its effectiveness in the world market and, more particularly, in the
United States.
What we do know is that the price of uranium, or "yellowcake," was
* J.D. (1979) Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy
Court, Southern District of Ohio.

t

On January 29, 1981, Gulf Oil Company and Westinghouse Electric Corporation

announced a settlement of Westinghouse's Chicago-based uranium cartel litigation against
Gulf Oil Corp.
Under terms of the settlement, .
Gulf will pay Westinghouse $25 million.
Further, Gulf agreed to drop a counterclaim that Westinghouse used illegal tactics
to drive competitors out of the nuclear-energy business ....
Gulf will (also) assume "complete responsibility" for delivering up to 13 million pounds of uranium
-currently valued at $350 million-to six of Westinghouse's utility customers.
Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1981, at 2, col. 2.
Settlement of such uranium cartel suits prevents a full judicial interpretation of these
complex antitrust and international issues, but Mr. Pikna's work more than adequately
presents and discusses these timely and important issues.
I Parisi, The Great Uranium Flap, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1978, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
2 See Appendix A, infra. At least one commentator stated that this defense should fail.
Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977).
3 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 76 F.R.D. 47, 50 (W.D. Pa.
1977).
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$5 per pound when the cartel was organized in 1972, threatening to drop
4
to $4 and it is now over $40 per pound.
The resultant litigation promises to be time-consuming, complex, and
heatedly contested as many of this nation's best-known law firms jockey
for positions which allow their clients to prevail. Seventeen utilities sued
Westinghouse Electric Corporation in Virginia for breach of its uranium
delivery contracts. Westinghouse sued uranium producers in Illinois for
alleged antitrust violations due to the producers' participation in an international uranium cartel. Moreover, discovery issues pertaining to documents located abroad are being contested in New Mexico. This note will
explore this litigation and analyze the application of two defenses, the act
of state and sovereign compulsion doctrines, to the antitrust violations
which Westinghouse alleged in its Illinois complaint. Initially, the note
presents a detailed analysis of the facts and explores the development
and status of the act of state and sovereign compulsion doctrines. Subsequent analysis examines the applicability of such doctrines as defenses in
the uranium cartel litigation. Explanatory footnotes serve to raise and
discuss issues beyond the scope of this note.
II.
A.

THE INTERNATIONAL URANIUM CARTEL

History

In 1976, documents surfaced in Australia5 and California6 which indicated the existence of an international uranium cartel. In 1971 a Londonbased conglomerate, Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) approached the Canadian
Government concerning the formation of a cartel for controlling uranium
markets.7 The initial meeting was held in Paris, France, on February 1-4,
1972.8 Government representatives from Canada, Australia, South Africa,
and France,9 as well as producer representatives from these countries and
Britain," quietly"' met and effectively allocated markets, rigged bids, and
I International Uranium Cartel: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 129 (1977) (statement of John E. Moss) [hereinafter cited as IUC Hearings].
The IUC Hearings contain a great deal of testimony and numerous documents which explain the history and actions of the international uranium cartel.
Parisi, supra note 1.
6 IUC Hearings,supra note 4, pt. 2, at 1 (statement of Albert Gore, Jr.). Credit for the
discovery of the documents is given to an environmental group, Friends of the Earth. Bumham, Justice Agency, Senate Panel Get Files Indicating Price-Fixing of Uranium, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 30, 1976, at 26, col. 1; Bus. WEEK, Sept. 26, 1977, at 125.
1 IUC Hearings,supra note 4, pt. 2, at 1 (statement of Albert Gore, Jr.).
8 IUC Hearings,supra note 4, at 665.
9 TIME, Nov. 21, 1977, at 98.
10 Id. at 96. Various foreign suppliers who either contracted or offered to contract with
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fixed prices for uranium.12 Gulf Oil Corporation, through its wholly
(GMCL), 5
owned Canadian subsidiary, Gulf Minerals of Canada Limited
14
was the only known participant from the United States.
Subsequent meetings in February 1971 resulted in the establishment
of a secretariat 15 with the power to punish those who violated the cartel's
orders.1 6 Although meetings were held at various locations around the
world from 1972 until 1975,17 the price of uranium was initially fixed in
Johannesburg, South Africa, on May 29, 1972.18 At that time, the price of
uranium sold to Japan, Taiwan, and Korea was 30 cents per pound higher
than the sales price in other countries. 19 Prices were later increased on

October 9, 1973,
in London, England,20 and on January 28, 1974, in
21
Johannesburg.
The reason for establishing the Club2 2 was clear to its participants.
The 100,000 ton uranium supply was approximately four times greater
utilities of the United States are:
1. From Canada: Rio Algom (a subsidiary of RTZ), Agnew Lake Mines, Eldorado Nuclear Pyramid Gold Mines, Denison Mines, and Gulf Minerals of Canada Limited.
2. From Australia: Mary Kathleen Uranium Limited, Ranger Export Development Company, and Queensland Mines Limited.
3. From Germany: Uranerz and Urangesellschaft.
4. From France: Uranex.
5. From South Africa: Nuclear Fuels Corporation (Nufcor).
6. From England: RTZ.
IUC Hearings,supra note 4, at 340 (statement of Patrick McLain).
11 IUC Hearings, supra note 4, at 176. On February 8, 1972, the Wall Street Journal
reported on "backstage" talks having occurred in Paris. Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1972, at 8, col. 4.
12 IUC Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 2. (statement of Albert Gore, Jr.).
13 IUC Hearings, supra note 4, at 132 (statement of Jerry McAfee).
4 TIME, supra note 9, at 96.
15The meetings were held in Paris February 22-24, 1972, and the secretariat was later
described as a joint marketing research organization. IUC Hearings,supra note 4, at 177.
The cartel, dubbed the "Uranium Market Research Organization," has allegedly ceased operations, but the Uranium Institute has been created in London, "claiming to be just an
umbrella group for uranium users and suppliers." Bus. WEEK, supra note 6, at 126; Akron
Beacon J., May 14, 1978 (Parade Magazine), at 1.
"JIUC Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 2 (statement of Albert Gore, Jr.).
17 IUC Hearings, supra note 4, at 665.
1S Akron Beacon J., supra note 15.
1"Id. The higher price is a result of increased sales costs as business must be done
through agents. See Draft Report prepared by Frank R. O'Hara of Gulf Oil Corp. re Uranium Market Research Organization (July 20, 1972), reprintedin IUC Hearings,supra note
4, pt. 2, at 78 [hereinafter cited as O'Hara Draft Report].
10 IUC Hearings, supra note 4, at 342.
21

Id.

The Uranium Market Research Organization was known as the "Club" to its members. 'ME, supra note 9, at 96.
22
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than the 1971 world demand of 26,000 tons.2" Thus, mining uranium was
not a profitable venture.24 Furthermore, newly discovered Australian
uranium deposits threatened to maintain the excessive uranium supply
until the early 1980's.26 Open domestic markets were to be maintained in
France, South Africa, Australia, Canada, and the United States.2" The exclusion of the U.S. market would, however, possibly be reviewed when the
Atomic Energy Commission of the United States lifted its ban on imports
of uranium. 2 Indeed, beginning in 1977, the import ban on foreign ura28
nium fuel was gradually phased out.
The cartel was admittedly effective in market allocation and raising
the price of uranium overseas.2 9 Nevertheless, a disputed question exists
as to whether the cartel raised prices in the United States. Gulf Oil Corporation has stated that the prices purportedly adopted by the Club were
below the prevailing prices in the United States.30 Contrary testimony has
established that significant quantities of uranium were purchased by U.S.
utilities from foreign suppliers during the Club's operations."' Nuclear
power corporations purchased uranium at cartel prices and industrial and
family consumers were required to pay more for electricity.32 In New
York State alone, the short run cost to consumers may have run as high
as $1 billion.3 3 The exact impact of the Club on U.S. prices is difficult to
establish, 34 but the consumer is clearly paying the price as a result of the
Club's activities.
B.

Canada:Actor or Reactor?

The Canadian policy regarding uranium exports was first outlined to
the Canadian House of Commons on June 3, 1965. This policy provided
export safeguards to ensure the peaceful use of uranium, and stockpiling
13 IUC Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 2 (statement of Albert Gore, Jr.).
21 It Worked for the Arabs ....
FORBES, Jan. 15, 1975, at 19.
25 TIME, supra note 9, at 96.
26 O'Hara Draft Report, supra note 19, at 75.
27 Id.
28 TIME, supra note 9, at 98.
29 IUC Hearings, supra note 4, at 231 (statement of S.A. Zagnoli).
30 Id. at 150 (statement of Gulf Oil Corp.).
11 At the minimum, contracts were signed between cartel members and U.S. utilities,
which were said to be excluded from the cartel, at prices which matched those of the price
schedule agreed upon at the Club's meetings. Id. at 343 (statement of Albert Gore, Jr.). The
Tennessee Valley Authority, for instance, purchased approximately 20 million pounds of
uranium from three cartel members. IUC Hearings,supra note 4, pt. 2, at 2 (statement of
Albert Gore, Jr.). See FORBES, supra note 24, at 20.
32 IUC Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 3 (statement of Oliver Koppell); TIME, supra
note 9, at 96.
33 TIME, supra note 9, at 96.

3 Id. at 98.
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to ensure the continued operation of Canadian uranium mines while markets developed for the ore.3 5 Due to the growing world demand for uranium and the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by many countries,
the Government described "its uranium policy in greater detail to ensure
that full account [be] taken of the Canadian public interest in these new
circumstances. 36 Prior to approval by the appropriate federal agency of
permits for the export of uranium or thorium, such export contracts were
to be examined in detail to "cover all aspects and implications of the contract such as nuclear safeguards, the relationship between contracting
parties, reserves, rate of exploitation, domestic requirements, domestic
processing facilities, and selling and pricing policy" 37 (emphasis added).

Canadian national interest was served by the international uranium
marketing arrangement ss because it was "defensive in nature and directed
at protecting the Canadian industry and Canadian communities against
restrictive actions by the U.S."3 9 Indeed, on several occasions the Canadian Government advised the U.S. Government that U.S. foreign uranium
restrictions4 ° contravened the international responsibilities of the United
States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 41 The Canadian Government nonetheless notifed the U.S. Government of steps taken
42
toward the formation of the Club.
The Canadian Government authorized its crown corporations to participate in the international uranium marketing arrangement. A regula"Canadian Uranium Policy Statement (statement of Hon. Otto E. Lang in the House
of Commons, June 19, 1969), reprintedin Gulf Oil Corporation, Position Paper re Uranium
Marketing Arrangement, at 7 (June 9, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Gulf Position Paper] [copies on file at Case Western Reserve Journal of InternationalLaw].
31 Id. See also Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
'7Gulf Position Paper, supra note 35, at 8.
38 Press Release by Hon. Alastair Gillespie (Oct. 14, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Gillespie
Press Release], in ENERGY, MINEs & RESOURCES CANADA NEWS RELEASE 7/53, at 1 [hereinafter cited as EMR NEWS RELEASE] [copies on fie at Case Western Reserve Journal of
InternationalLaw].
39 Id. at 5.
40 GovT OF CAN., BACKGROUND PAPER ON THE CANADIAN URANIUM INDUSTRY'S AcTIVITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL URANIUM MARKETING (Sept. 22, 1976) [hereinafter cited as CANADIAN
BACKGROUND PAPER], reprintedin Gulf Position Paper, supra note 35, at 10. For a thorough
study of the uranium market in the United States, see Joskow, supra note 2.
41 CANADIAN BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 40, at 10; Gillespie Press Release, supra
note 38, at 2. See also Written Communications with the U.S. Government on Uranium
Marketing, reprinted in EMR NEWS RELEASE, supra note 38, at 13-25. See also General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 501 U.N.T.S.
298.
", Letter from H.C. Armstrong to A.S. Friedman (Feb. 14, 1972), reprinted in EMR
NEWS RELEASE, supra note 38, at 19.
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tion issued under section 9 of the Atomic Energy Control Act43 kept export pricing and quota provisions in line with the Club's arrangements."
These prices were revised periodically, and rarely exceeded U.S. domestic
market prices. 45 The Canadian Government realized, however, that a separate issue 4 was raised by the Uranium Information Security
Regulations.
The Regulations were passed because it became obvious, late in
1976, that the government [of Canada] would have to act to prevent documentation on the marketing arrangements from being released to U.S.
courts. Failure to take such action would have placed the government in
the untenable position of allowing evidence to be provided to a foreign
court for use in the possible prosecution of Canadian nationals for acts
that were in accordance with Canadian law and government policy. 7
These Regulations were amended to limit their application to "information relating to the export from Canada or marketing for use outside
Canada of uranium or its derivatives and to persons associated with uranium producers and the federal government. '4 The terms of the Regulations could no longer be waived by any Canadian official. 49 A diplomatic
solution, however, to the conflict between extraterritoriality and sovereignty principles is being sought by the Canadian and U.S.
governments.5"
3 Atomic Energy Control Regulations Amendment P.C. 1972-1719, STAT. 0. & R. 72301 (1972), reprinted in Appendix B., infra. See also Nuclear Installations, Fissionable
Materials and Ores Decree, 403 Decree of 4th Sept. 1969, as amended by Decree No. 242 of
26 April 1972, pt. 3, § 6, reprinted in NUCLEAR L. BULL., Nov. 1972, at 6.
4 Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 1; CANADIAN BACKGROUND PAPER, supra
note 40, at 12.
'5Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 4-5; CANADIAN BACKGROUND PAPER, supra
note 40, at 12.
4" Uranium Information Security Regulation P.C. 1976-2368, STAT. 0. & R. 76-644
(1976), reprinted in Appendix C, infra.
4'Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 8. For a more detailed explanation of the
policy behind non-disclosure of protected documents, see Gulf Position Paper, supra note
35, at 16-17. It appears that the Uranium Information Security Regulations do not take
United States sovereignty into account. As a result, multinational companies will increasingly face the dilemma of having to obey conflicting laws as a risk of doing business.
4'Gillespie Press Release, supranote 38, at 9; see Uranium Information Security Regulation P.C. 1977-2923, STAT. 0 & R. 77-836 (1977), reprinted in Appendix D, infra.
49 Brief of the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae at 3 n.3, General Atomic Co. v.
Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977) (Petitions for Writs of Certiorari Nos. 77-1236, 77-1269).
60 Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 10. Objections from the State Department
and Canadian Government probably protected Gulf from felony charges and allowed Gulf to
plead no contest to a criminal misdemeanor information. Burnham, Data Show U.S. Rejected Uranium Cartel Prosecution,N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1979, §1, at col. 2. Mr. McAfee,
Chairman of Gulf Oil Corp., testified that he was involved in Gulf's efforts to get permission
from the Canadian authorities to produce the documents. Wall St. J., June 6, 1980, at 10,
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C. The Major Litigants: Westinghouse and Gulf Oil
1. The Position of Westinghouse Electric Corporation
The federal government allowed private businesses to purchase uranium directly from producers in 1966. 51 Utilities which pioneered the development of nuclear powered electric plants needed fuel for their reactors. Thus, manufacturers of such reactors made long-term fuel supply
commitments. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, a major manufacturer
of nuclear reactors, entered into an unsurpassed volume of refined uranium commitments. 52 Westinghouse's marketing and sales strategy emphasized the advantages of a guaranteed supply of low-cost uranium. Although Westinghouse initially honored its contracts, its policy shifted
53
when it was unable to fulfill its commitments.
On September 8, 1975, Westinghouse announced that it could not
meet its uranium contracts." Westinghouse had sold 65 million more
pounds of yellowcake than it had in inventory or due from suppliers. 5
Selling uranium from inventory without making additional purchases increased return on investment and improved cash flow. 56 Although most of

the pre-1974 contracts had an escalation clause to cover various production cost increases, the contracts did not provide for price increases resulting from changes in the market. 5" Thus, Westinghouse could lose over
$2 billion if required to fulfill its contractual obligations.58
Westinghouse has declared that it was "legally. excused" from its fuel
contracts under section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 9 The
Code states that "unforeseen circumstances" are the key to the "commercial impracticability" defense.6 0 Westinghouse had raised the Club's activities as one of the principal unforeseen circumstances which artificially
increased uranium prices.6 There is some evidence which tends to support this position. Westinghouse might argue that the Club adversely afcol. 2.
51

Karp, Uranium Short Sale, BARRON'S, Oct. 17, 1977, at 5.

2 Id.
53 Id.

Id. at 18.
Id. at 5; FORTUNE, Aug. 1976, at 154.
Karp, supra note 51, at 5.
FORTUNE, supra note 55, at 154; Bus. WEEK, supra note 6, at 125.
FORTUNE, supra note 55, at 147, 154; Bus. WEEK, supra note 6, at 125.
Karp, supra note 51, at 18. U.C.C. §2-615 (Appendix A, infra).
' U.C.C. §2-615 (Appendix A, infra).
In re Uranium Indus. Antitrust Lit., 458 F. Supp. 1223 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978); In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Lit., 436 F. Supp. 990, 991 (J.PM.D.L. 1977);
Bus. WEEK, supra note 6, at 131. See CHEM. WEEK, Nov. 8, 1978, at 15; FORTUNE, supra note
55, at 154. See also In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 76 F.R.D. 47, 52
(W.D. Pa. 1977).
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fected its package export dealers. The Club was prepared to argue that
foreign producers would make their uranium available at a price lower
than the U.S. market price.62 Furthermore, Canadian uranium producers
met in Ottawa on September 5, 1972 and discussed the impact of Westinghouse's bidding in Europe. Some members suggested that Westinghouse should be approached directly.6 3 ". . . The consensus finally
reached was that if the club was to survive as a viable entity, it would be
necessary to delineate where the competition was and the nature of its
strength as a prelude to eliminating it once and for all." 6' A subsequent
letter sent to certain Gulf executives" modified the above emphasis by
deleting the elimination of competition language.66 As noted by John
Atkisson, this deletion represents a significant change in the attitude of
the uranium producers.6 7
Many utilities believe that Westinghouse was not a victim of "unforeseen circumstances." They argue that foreign cartels in basic commodities
are "eminently foreseeable,"68 and that Westinghouse apparently rejected
bids from 1973 to 1975 to buy uranium at "reasonable" prices.6 9 Conse70
quently, the consumer was forced to pay for Westinghouse's speculation.
It may well be that section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides the "ultimate in a price renegotiation strategy"71 such that settlements will follow.7 2 Westinghouse, however, has a problem:
The healthier Westinghouse looks-and the better its earnings prospects in the years to come-the more pounds of flesh the utilities will
demand. For this reason, Kirby [Westinghouse Chairman Robert E.
O'Hara Draft Report, supra note 19, at 83.
IUC Hearings, supra note 4, at 182; letter from Roy D. Jackson, Jr. to Frank R.
O'Hara (Oct. 11, 1972), reprinted in IUC Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 107 [hereinafter
02

13

cited as Jackson Letter].
" Jackson Letter, supra note 63; IUC Hearings, supra note 4, at 594. Prior to becom-

ing President of Oil Insurance, Ltd., Mr. Jackson was an attorney for Gulf Oil Corp. until
early August, 1972. Mr. O'Hara effectively succeeded Mr. Jackson. One or two contacts oc-

curred between the two men, and the Jackson Letter followed. IUC Hearings,supra note 4,
pt. 2, at 68-69, 103-166 (statement of Roy D. Jackson, Jr.). Mr. O'Hara then sent a letter to
some Gulf executives, "parroting" Mr. Jackson's advice. Id. at 112 (statement of John McElroy Atkisson); letter from Frank R. O'Hara to Nick M. Ediger (Nov. 20, 1972), reprinted
in IUC Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 109-11 [hereinafter cited as O'Hara Letter (1972)].
0" O'Hara Letter (1972), supra note 64.
00
07
08

Id.
IUC Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 112 (statement of John McElroy Atkisson).
Karp, supra note 51, at 18. The utilities also argue that Westinghouse tried to join

the Club. Id. at 18-19.
"' Westinghouse rejected bids which would have provided 60.8 million pounds of uranium, almost enough to cover its shortage of 65 million pounds. Id. at 19.
70 CHEM. WEEK,June

14, 1978, at 19.

11 Karp, supra note 51, at 20.
71

Id.; see

CHEM. WEEK,

supra note 70, at 19.
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Kirby] and his associates are in a dilemma. To counter the low price of
Westinghouse stock they must trumpet the company's widely ignored
7 3
strengths. Unfortunately, the utilites are listening, too.

At the very least, "it was foolhardy [for Westinghouse] to let the uranium commitments get so far ahead of the supply in hand. '"74 There does
not seem to be any reason to believe that a buyer must assume the seller's
risk of short sales.75 The pricing policies of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) contributed to an increase in all energy
prices,76 but it is difficult to measure accurately the effect on uranium
prices.7 7 In contrast, it might be possible to prove that the Club increased
domestic prices for uranium.
2.

The Position of Gulf Oil Corporation

Gulf Oil Corporation, the eighth largest industrial concern in the
United States,7 8 has attempted to maintain a consistent position throughout the uranium cartel controversy.7 9 Gulf stated that the Canadian Government compelled it to join the Club,80 and that Gulf was not in viola-

tion of the U.S. antitrust laws." Furthermore, Gulf argued that the
73 FORTUNE, supra note 55, at 156.
7'

Id. at 154.

71 CHEM. WEEK, supra note 70, at 19;
76 FORTUNE, supra note 55, at 154.

Karp, supra note 51, at 18.

Karp, supra note 51, at 18; TIME, June 12, 1978, at 72.
TInE, supra note 77, at 72.
71 Gulf Oil Corporation's position was clearly developed and stated in Gulf Position
Paper, supra note 35.
11 IUC Hearings, supra note 4, at 132-33 (statement of Jerry McAfee); Parisi, supra
note 1, at 1, col. 1; see Bus. WEEK, supra note 6, at 125; TME, supra note 9, at 98.
81 Gulf Position Paper, supra note 35, at 19-21, 23; see letter from Frank R. O'Hara to
N.M. Ediger (Feb. 1, 1974), reprintedin IUC Hearings,supra note 4, pt. 2, at 127-30 [hereinafter cited as O'Hara Letter (1974)]; Parisi, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1. Particularly important is the Memorandum of the Department of Justice Concerning Antitrust and Foreign
7
78

Commerce, [1972] 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 5129 [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Memo-

randum], which states:
A foreign government may, because of its economic or national interest in
"rationalizing" competition in certain industries, promote certain private cooperative agreements or understandings by companies within that industry. It may,
therefore, expect a U.S. company seeking to do business in its territory to agree to
abide by the governmentally-desired-but not officially imposed-system of private arrangements as a condition of securing (and keeping) the necessary permits
and approvals.
Such officially encouraged arrangements may involve, for example, the agreed
pricing of products at a level which will not take markets away from competing
products important to the local company, or the entering into by competitors of
cooperative agreements for joint utilization of existing production facilities rather
than the construction of new ones which might create overcapacity.
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cartel's prices were below those prevailing in the United States, 2 and
that the U.S. market was specifically excluded. s 3 Gulf also observed that
the price of uranium was affected by other factors, including:
(a) U.S. policies, particularly the government embargo, the stockpiling
of uranium and sales from that stockpile;
(b) The policies of foreign governments such as Australia which prohibited exporting uranium;
(c) The Arab oil embargo in 1973 increased the pressure to develop
nuclear power plants;
(d) Higher exploration and development costs;
(e) Lower uranium ore grades and fewer discoveries of uranium;
(f) Inflation; and
(g) The activities of Westinghouse Electric Corporation."
Gulf's charges that Westinghouse was itself a major contributing fac8 5
tor to the rapid escalation in the price of uranium are well documented.
Gulf's Position Paper of June 9, 1977 provided several sources of information which bolster Gulf's allegations. Reports by the Nuclear Exchange
Corporation (NUEXCO) implied that Westinghouse was primarily responsible,86 and two other sources reached similar conclusions.8 7 Perhaps
Official encouragement of arrangements of this sort is especially likely where
necessary raw materials or labor or transportation facilities are in short supply,
foreign exchange may be limited or the government may wish to prevent a single
company from becoming too important to the national economy.
In general, restrictions such as these applying to commerce in the host country and imposed by the host government will create no antitrust hazards for the
American company. In particular, price or capacity restrictions in the foreign market imposed at the insistence of the foreign government and not involving exports
to the United States should not violate U.S. antitrust laws.
This specific section is quoted in the Gulf Position Paper, supra note 35, at 20-21 and the
O'Hara Letter (1974), supra.
812IUC Hearings, supra note 4, at 150 (statement of Gulf Oil Corp.); Bus. WEEK, supra
note 6, at 125.
83 IUC Hearings,supra note 4, at 133 (statement of Jerry McAfee); O'Hara Draft Report, supra note 19, at 75; Bus. WEEK, supra note 6, at 125; Parisi, supra note 1, at 1, col 1.
84 IUC Hearings, supra note 4, at 136 (statement of Jerry McAfee). New environmental, safety, and health standards were apparently also a contributing factor. Gulf Position
Paper, supra note 35, at 26; see also id. at 28-34.
81 Gulf Position Paper, supra note 35, at 26-34.
8e Id. at 26-28. The impact of the NUEXCO reports may be diminished, however, as
the Justice Department instituted contempt proceedings against George White, Jr., executive vice-president of NUEXCO, alleging that Mr. White destroyed business records which
he knew the federal grand jury had subpoenaed on June 16, 1976. N.Y. Times, June 3, 1978,
§1 at 27, col. 4.
817In a study by Joskow for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Westinghouse
was cited as the main source for the increase in uranium prices in 1975 and 1976. Gulf
Position Paper, supra note 35, at 30. See Joskow, supra note 2, at 168. This might, however,
imply that Westinghouse was not the main source for the increase in uranium prices prior to
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Gulf Chairman Jerry McAfee best summarized his company's position
when he stated:
Gulf has been taking the brunt of this in the press due to our unique
position of being a U.S. domiciled parent corporation with a foreign
minerals subsidiary which was required by the Canadian government to
participate in an international marketing arrangement....
...Westinghouse, with no record as a uranium producer, sold short
some 60 million pounds of uranium and now is attempting to win court
sanction for breaking its commitments. I think they are entitled to the
same right that any commodity speculator enjoys when he has badly misjudged the market.18

Presumably, Mr. McAfee meant that Westinghouse had the right to
bankrupt itself.89

D. The Lawsuits
The uranium cartel lawsuits occurring in the United States" can be
grouped into three broad categories. 91 The first category involves breach
1975. By not covering its uranium contracts, Westinghouse prevented normal market factors
from forcing an earlier rise in the price of uranium.
Kirkland & Ellis, which represented Westinghouse in certain cartel matters, stated in a
1976 report prepared for the American Petroleum Institute that Westinghouse's Sept. 8,
1975 announcement (Parisi, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1) contributed to the increase in uranium prices. See Gulf Position Paper, supra note 35, at 29. This does not seem to imply that
Westinghouse was responsible for pre-1975 increases in uranium prices.
" See Gulf Position Paper, supra note 35, at 23-24.
89 TImE, supra note 9, at 98. Gulf could gain or lose several million dollars in all of its
cartel-related cases. Parisi, supra note 1, at 13, col. 1.
10See generally Comment, The InternationalUranium Cartel: Litigation and Legal
Implications, 14 TExAs INT'L L.J. 59 (1979); Kohlmeir, The Uranium Affair, 13 J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 199 (1978). For further discussion of cartels and the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws, see, e.g., Annot., 40 A.L.R. FED. 343 (1978); Marks, State Department
Perspectives on Antitrust Enforcement Abroad, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 153 (1978); Cira,
Current Problems in the ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Antitrust Law, 13 J. Imr'L L.
& ECON. 157 (1978). Although beyond the scope of this article, the Club's activities have
given rise to litigation in countries other than the United States. See, e.g., Re Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. and Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273 (High Ct. Justice 1977); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Lit., [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977), aff'g [1977] 3 and
W.L.R. 492 (C.A.); see generally Baker, Antitrust Conflicts Between Friends:Canada and
the United States in the Mid-1970's, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 165, 187-91 nn.118-39 (1978);
Note, Discovery in Great Britain: The Evidence (Proceedingsin Other Jurisdictions)Act,
11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 323, 324-25 nn.4-7, 326-27 nn.18-20 (1978).
"1Each broad category is comprised of numerous cases, but not all cases fit into specific
compartments. For example, plaintiffs in one complex securities action alleged that Westinghouse either misrepresented or failed to disclose facts relating to its contracts to supply
uranium. Simon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 480 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Lit., 436 F.Supp. 990 (J.M.P.D.L. 1977). Fur-
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of contract issues which have been joined in Richmond, Virginia. 2 The
second category encompasses price-fixing issues. This litigation, centered
in Chicago, Illinois, probably will not commence proceedings until September, 1981.11 The third category concerns uranium purchasers who believe they should not be bound by their contracts because the price of
uranium was artificially inflated due to the Club's activities.9 This litigation is located in Sante Fe, New Mexico.
1.

The Virginia Litigation

Utility customers of Westinghouse filed 13 federal actions in as many
districts against Westinghouse.95 Fundamentally, each utility alleged that
Westinghouse had a contractual obligation "for the present or future delivery of uranium."96 Since these actions involved common questions of
fact, they were transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia in order to
"best serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the
just and efficient conduct of the litigation. 9 7 The trial which began on
thermore, Gulf pleaded no contest on June 2, 1978, to a criminal misdemeanor information
filed against it by the Justice Department. One of the alleged violations was the Club's
refusal to sell uranium to Westinghouse as a middleman for both domestic and foreign utilities. N.Y. Times, supra note 86, at 27, col. 4. Though fined $40,000, Gulf's no contest plea
was dictated by the fact that a successful defense would have cost more than the possible
$50,000 maximum penalty. Id.; CHEM. WEEK, June 14, 1978, at 19. Gulf claims that the
settlement is not an admission of guilt. CHEM. WEEK, supra note 70, at 19. The offense
charged is now a felony, however, with a maximum fine of $1 million. N.Y. Times, supra
note 86, at 27, col. 4. Recent developments also revealed that the State Department was
aware of a potential uranium cartel prior to its inception, but chose not to inform the Justice Department. Furthermore, in a lengthy fact memorandum, completed March 21, 1978
for the Justice Department, it was unanimously recommended to prosecute Gulf Oil Corporation and eight other companies. Thirteen more corporations would also have been named
as co-conspirators, but the concern over "diplomatic furor with the countries affected" resulted in limiting the number of defendants "as a matter of comity and prosecutorial discretion." Eventually, objections from the State Department and Canadian Government helped
prevent felony indictments of Gulf and the eight other companies. Burnham, supra note 50,
at 1, col. 2.
92 Parisi, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1.
9 Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1980, at 14, col. 2.
Parisi, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1.
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 405 F.Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L.
1975). The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) acted quickly against Westinghouse but was
unable to get partial summary judgment. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 69 F.R.D. 5 (E.D. Tenn. 1975). TVA's action was one of those joined in the Virginia
litigation.
" In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 405 F.Supp. 316 (J.P.M.D.L.
1975). Westinghouse originally claimed that OPEC's actions had increased the cost of all
forms of energy. Comment, supra note 90, at 59, 77-78.
" In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 405 F.Supp. 316, 318
(J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
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September 12, 19779s is very important to Westinghouse, not only because Westinghouse wants to establish that the Club's activities made it
"commercially impracticable" for Westinghouse to meet its contractual
obligations, but also because the Richmond trial is a "dress rehearsal" for
the Chicago trial." Significantly, most of the 17 utility companies suing
Westinghouse have already settled."0
Many legal issues have been raised in an effort to get to the heart of
the Virginia litigation. 0 1 Perhaps the most notable issues of international
impact arose when Westinghouse served RTZ with an order to supply
information on the Club's activities. 02 Top RTZ executives went to the
U.S. Embassy in London and argued that their testimony might incrimi:8 In re Uranium Indus. Antitrust Lit., 458 F.Supp. 1223, 1226 n.4 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978).
9 Bus. WEEK, supra note 6, at 125-26.
'00 The Duquesne Light Co., the Pennsylvania Power Co., and the Ohio Edison Co.
settled in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Bus. WEEK, March 21, 1977, at 44; see In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Lit., 436 F.Supp. 990, 991 n.1 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977); see
Solomon, A Businesslike Way to Resolve Legal Disputes, FORTUNE, Feb. 26, 1979, at 82.
Westinghouse claims that the value of the settlement was $6 million; the utilities claim the
value of the settlement was $11.5 million. Bus. WEEK, Apr. 11, 1977, at 40. The Alabama
Power Co., the Houston Lighting & Power Co., and Texas Utilities Services, Inc. have also
settled. Solomon, supra, at 82. See generally Karp, supra note 51, at 5. The settlements
have been more varied than the traditional contract remedies to which the court would be
limited. Settlement packages have included cash, uranium property rights, and various noncash payments in goods and services which cost Westinghouse less than their fair market
value. Solomon, supra, at 82. Later settlement packages have included cash shares in any
proceeds Westinghouse might recover in its antitrust suit in Illinois against the uranium
producers. By mid-1980, all of these lawsuits had been settled at a cost to Westinghouse of
$950 million. Hymowitz, Westinghouse Thinks It's Out of the Woods; Some People Wonder, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
101 The TVA was enjoined from exhausting the administrative remedies available under
the "Disputes Clause" of its contract with Westinghouse because TVA had waived its rights
to invoke that clause. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 429 F.Supp. 940
(E.D. Va. 1977). Gulf Oil Corp. was ordered to produce various listed documents for inspection and copying by Westinghouse. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit.,
76 F.R.D. 47 (W.D. Pa. 1977). The Court stated that strong evidence revealed that coordinated action by the uranium producers resulted in the dramatic upsurge in the price of
uranium in the American market. Id. at 57. Moreover, it was decided not to transfer the
Illinois litigation and various securities actions to the Eastern District of Virginia. In re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Lit., 436 F.Supp. 990 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
Westinghouse's "commercial impracticability" defense was inapplicable to one contract
to supply fuel to the Florida Power & Light Co. because the contract was entered into prior
to the effective date of the Florida Uniform Commercial Code, FLA. STAT. ANN. §16 (West).
The U.C.C. was applicable to the second fuel contract entered into after that effective date.
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 579 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1978).
Though not an issue, it was also noted that the law of excuse was the same under the U.C.C.
as under pre-Code case law, the position set forth in the Florida Comments to U.C.C. §2615. Id. at 863.
102 Ross-Skinner, Antitrust Tensions With Europe, DUN's REv., May 1978, at 103.
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nate them under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 103 The
Justice Department wanted to obtain evidence for its grand jury investigation of the Club and therefore it granted use immunity to the RTZ
officials.'0 The United Kingdom, however, disallowed such discovery because it was deemed prejudicial to its security and sovereignty." 5 As one
commentator observed:
What this saga reveals is how determined members of the uranium
"club" are to prevent evidence from falling into the hands of American
prosecutors. England became a key forum for a very practical reason: it
is the only country that has a "club" member and has not erected a general barrier against U.S. discovery of uranium documents.'
Other discovery actions have had a great impact on many Club-related lawsuits. Westinghouse has been prevented from examining certain
records physically located in Canada and from deposing certain individuals. 10 7 The majority opinion in this discovery action based its decision to
vacate the civil contempt citation and sanctions against Rio Algom Corporation on questionable reasoning. Serious consideration was given to
Rio Algom's argument that if it complied with the discovery order, "it
would be in violation of Canadian law' 0 s and subject to severe sanctions
in that country."109 The Court relied heavily on Societe Internationale
Pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers,"0 and
applied its "balancing approach" by looking at such factors as Rio Algom's diligent effort to produce materials not subject to the Canadian
regulation, its attempt to get a waiver from the Canadian authorities and
103Id.; Baker, supra note 90, at 188.
104 Note, supra note 90, at 325 n.7.
100 Id.; see Baker, supra note 90, at 188; Ross-Skinner, supra note 102, at 103.
10 Baker, supra note 90, at 189.

In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir.
1977). However, Gulf will request the Canadian government to declassify the cartel-related
records of GMCL, as it does not believe that the documents contain incriminating evidence.
The Canadian government may not be able to release them, however, due to the Liberal
administration's commitments to other countries to keep that information secret. Petzinger
& Bayless, Gulf Oil to Ask Canada to Declassify Data That May Resolve Uranium Cartel
Fight, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1979, at 16, col. 1. One source states that Gulf apparently tried
to keep its connection with the Club confidential: first, by not bringing sensitive documents
into the United States; second, by shipping documents from U.S. offices to Canadian offices;
and third, by filing documents in the offices of counsel so that the attorney-client privilege
could be claimed. Gulf disputes those allegations. Burnham, Gulf Said To Conceal Cartel
Link, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1980, at 27, col. 6.
'8 Uranium Information Security Regulation P.C. 1976-2368, STAT. 0. & R. 76-644
(1976), reprinted in Appendix C, infra.
109In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 563 F.2d 922, 996 (10th Cir.
107

1977).

110 357

U.S. 197 (1958)[hereinafter cited as Societe Internationale].
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the physical location of the records in Canada. The Court also viewed the
Canadian "national interest," as illustrated by an Ontario Supreme Court
opinion,""' and observed that Westinghouse's defense in the Virginia litigation did not stand or fall on the contested discovery order.1 2
The dissenting opinion in Westinghouse"3 appears to be more persuasive. The dissent noted that Rio Algom is only a witness in the breach
of contract action, 114 and also sought to clarify several factors. Firstly, the
dissent indicated that Canadian regulations1 5 seem to have been promulgated to prevent discovery in the present litigation. 1 6 Secondly, the Canadian Government's policy was to protect its uranium industry from an
oversupply and low price situation. 117 Thirdly, the Canadian regulations
were enacted contemporaneously "with the empanelling of a grand jury in
the United States to investigate possible antitrust violations by uranium
producers.""" Finally, the dissenting opinion observed that Rio Algom is
"I Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. and Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont.2d 273 (High Ct. Justice 1977).
1'2 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir.
1977).
113 Id. at 1000 (Doyle, J. dissenting).
114

Id.

I'5 Uranium Information Security Regulation P.C. 1976-2368, STAT. 0 & R. 76-644
(1976), reprinted in Appendix C, infra.
"I In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 563 F.2d 992, at 1001
(Doyle, J., dissenting). The Canadian Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources has stated:
"This action was taken in the light of the sweeping demand for such information by U.S.
subpoenas, which, while served on officers of U.S. companies, call for the presentation of
information in the possession of subsidiary or affiliate companies 'wherever located.'" 16
Ont.2d at 283; accord, 563 F.2d at 1002 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
17 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 563 F.2d at 1003 (Doyle,.J.,
dissenting). See 16 Ont.2d at 273; Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 1. However, as
stated in the preamble to its Atomic Energy Control Act, the Canadian policy is even
broader: "[I]t is essential in the national interest to make provision for the control and
supervision of the development, application, and use of atomic energy, and to enable Canada to participate effectively in measures of international control of atomic energy which
may hereafter be agreed upon." Canadian Uranium Policy Statement, supra note 35, at 8.
11 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 563 F.2d 992, 1002 (Doyle,
J., dissenting). The Canadian High Court of Justice became "convinced that the principal
reason the evidence and productions is [sic] being pursued is not for the Richmond proceedings." 16 Ont.2d at 289. As stated by that court:
What is evident is that the testimony and documents sought are central to Westinghouse's claim in the Illinois proceedings and, for that matter, to the Grand
Jury investigation and if procured will become available to both. The chief purpose, if not the real object of this exercise, in my opinion, is to search out documents which might have bearing on the Illinois proceedings.

Id.
The High Court of Justice also distinguished their practice and procedures from the
broad discovery rules of the United States, id. at 287; stated that the evidence sought was
not necessary for use at the Richmond trial or for the purposes of justice, id. at 288; and
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an "American corporation which does all of its substantive business in the
United States."' 9 Thus "if a balancing test is to be used and relief (for
Rio Algom Corporation) is to be granted, the case would have to show
more merit than we see here.'

120

Other courts have examined the merits of discovery claims and have
allowed such discovery to occur. Thus, the Tenth Circuit relieved Westinghouse of a stipulation and order which would have blocked the deposition of Mr. Adams, former president of Western Nuclear, Inc."' The stipulation was considered inequitable in that it would have prevented the
22
development of potentially critical facts.

It has been ruled that Westinghouse must honor its contracts to supply uranium to seven utilities, and it appears that the issue of damages
was resolved by mid-1980. 23 United States District Court Judge Robert
R. Merhige, Jr., who urged both sides to settle, stated that the utilities
were not entitled to "anything near the full measure of their prayers for
relief."124

2. The Illinois Litigation
On October 15, 1976, Westinghouse filed a suit in the Northern District of Illinois against 29 domestic and foreign uranium producers.2 5
also rested its conclusion to not enforce the letters rogatory on the Court's discretionary
power flowing from international comity, id. at 290. That Court also noted that "letters
rogatory should not be enforced against officers of Canadian corporations whose actions during the pertinent period had received the stamp of approval of the Canadian Government."
Id. at 292. Rio Algom Corp. is a Delaware corporation with its corporate office in Canada.
Therefore, the High Court of Justice's statement of non-enforcement should not have applied to Rio Algom Corp. and its officers.
119 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 563 F.2d 992, 1002 (Doyle,
J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 1003. Though the dissenting opinion balanced the strong policy reasons underlying the discovery rules on one side, it concluded by focusing on the Canadian policy of
protecting its local industries on the other side. Id. This overlooks the other Canadian national interests explored in note 117, supra. Neither opinion, therefore, seems totally
correct.
121 In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Lit., 570 F.2d 899, 902 (10th Cir.
1978).
222

Id.

The lawsuits in the Virginia litigation were apparently settled more than a year later
at a cost to Westinghouse of $950 million. Hymowitz, supra note 100, at 1, col. 6.
124 CHEM. WEEK, supra note 61, at 15. It therefore seems that Westinghouse, though
exposed to a potential liability of up to $2 billion, id., will benefit considerably from Judge
Merhige's discretion under U.C.C. §2-615 in awarding damages. Accord, Solomon, supra
note 100, at 82.
125 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (N.D. Ill.
1978). The defendants are Rio Algom Ltd., Rio Algom Corp., Rio Tinto Zinc Ltd., RTZ
Services Ltd., RTZ Corp., Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia Ltd., Mary Kathleen Uranium
12'
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Westinghouse alleged that the defendants allocated and divided the uranium market, and simultaneously conducted price-fixing activities. Moreover, Westinghouse claimed that it and other uranium purchasers were
the subjects of a boycott by the uranium producers.12 Westinghouse fur-

ther charged that the defendants' practices violated the Sherman Act,
section 1, and section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act. 127 Nine of the defendants defaulted.2 8
The major issues in the Illinois litigation will probably be contested
Ltd., Pancontinental Mining Ltd., Queensland Mines Ltd., Nuclear Fuels Corp., AngloAmerican Corp. of South Africa, Ltd., Engelhard Minerals and Chemicals Corp., Denison
Mines, Ltd., Denison Mines (U.S.) Inc., Noranda Mines Ltd., Gulf Oil Corp., Gulf Minerals
Canada Ltd., Kerr-McGee Corp., Anaconda Co., Getty Oil Co., Utah International Inc.,
Phelps Dodge Corp., Western Nuclear, Inc., Homestake Mining Co., Atlas Corp., Reserve
Oil and Minerals Corp., United Nuclear Corp., Federal Resources Corp., and Pioneer Nuclear, Inc. The Uranium Institute is named as a co-conspirator along with other unnamed
co-conspirators. Id. No early settlement seems likely in this case. Getshow, Westinghouse
Finds It Has Its Hands Full In Uranium-CartelSuit, Wall St. J., May 4, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
126 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F.Supp. 1284, 1288 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
127 Id. §1 of the Sherman Act and §73 of the Wilson Tariff Act are reprintedin Appendices E, F, infra.
128 Those defendants were Rio Algom Ltd., Rio Tinto Zinc Corp., Ltd., RTZ Services
Ltd., Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia Ltd., Mary Kathleen Uranium Ltd., Pancontinental
Mining Ltd., Queensland Mines Ltd., Nuclear Fuels Corp., and Anglo-American Corp. of
South Africa, Ltd. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F.Supp. 1284, 1286
(N.D. I1. 1978), modified, 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied 439 U.S. 955 (1978). See In re Uranium Indus. Antitrust Lit., 458 F.Supp. 1223,
1224 n.1 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978). See also CHEM. WEEK, July 25, 1979, at 25. These nine companies have been enjoined from attempting to transfer assets out of the United States without giving Westinghouse twenty days notice to enable it to contest such a transfer. However,
it is difficult to identify the assets of the defaulting companies since they must often be
traced through their subsidaries. Furthermore, if the assets of foreign firms are attached,
retaliatory action against Westinghouse could occur overseas. Matters should become even
more interesting when the amount of damages owed by the defaulting companies is determined. See Getshow, Wall St. J., supra note 125, at 1, col. 6; CHEM. WEEK, supra,at 25. The
default judgment entered against the nine foreign defendants, In re Uranium Antitrust Lit.,
473 F.Supp. 382 (N.D. II. 1979), was affirmed on appeal, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), but
the order on the issue of liability against those defendants was remanded by the three-judge
panel, which stated that the damages hearing could not be held until the liability of the
twenty non-defaulting defendants was determined. Another critical conclusion was that the
District Court had jurisdiction over the foreign concerns. Wall St. J., supra note 93, at 8,
col. 2. Discovery of certain foreign documents was granted in Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Urangesellschaft, 480 F.Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
An evidentiary hearing held in June 1980 focused on whether Gulf and several other
defendants made good-faith efforts to comply with a court demand for uranium-related
records located outside the United States. CHEM. WEEK, May 7, 1980, at 32; Wall St. J.,
June 4, 1980, at 17, col. 1; Wall St. J., June 6, 1980, at 10, col. 2; Wall St. J., June 25, 1980,
at 12, col. 1. The outcome of the hearing will undoubtedly influence the severity of the
sanctions imposed upon the defendants if they are found liable for the actions alleged in
Westinghouse's complaint. See Wall St. J., June 25, 1980, at 12, col. 1.
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in the fall of 1981.129 The existence of the cartel described in the com-

plaint 3 0 may encourage the defendants to argue an act of state defense.131
Several of the defendants have filed counterclaims against Westinghouse,
alleging that Westinghouse violated the antitrust laws by monopolizing or
attempting to monopolize the nuclear reactor market and nuclear reactor
fuel supplies.1 3 2 The defendants further alleged that antitrust laws were
violated when Westinghouse tied uranium sales to nuclear reactor and
fuel assembly sales, and also established exclusive dealing contracts with
utilities."'
It is ironic that in an action unrelated to Westinghouse's charges of
price fixing, General Atomic Company sought to invoke U.C.C. section 2129 Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1979, at 10, col. 4. It could take over ten years for all the
motions, counterclaims, and appeals to be finally decided. Getshow, supra note 125, at 1,
col. 6. Several motions to disqualify Kirkland & Ellis as Westinghouse's counsel on conflict
of interest grounds were originally denied. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448
F.Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1978). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals gave Westinghouse the
option of either dismissing Getty Oil Co., Gulf Oil Co., and Kerr-McGee Corp. from the
antitrust case or discharging Kirkland & Ellis as its counsel. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1322 (7th Cir. 1978). Gulf's motion to disquality Bighoe,
Stephenson, Carpenter & Croot from representing United Nuclear Corporaton was granted
in a separate decision. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir.
1978), rev'g 448 F.Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
TVA actions sharing substantially common allegations of conspiratorial activity with
the Illinois actions were transferred to the Northern District of Illinois. In re Uranium Industry Antitrust Lit., 458 F.Supp. 1223, 1228, 1232 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978). This centralization
was necessary to prevent duplicative discovery, eliminate the possibility of conflicting pretrial rulings, and to save time and effort for the parties, the witnesses, and the judiciary.
The international aspects of the case created discovery problems which made centralization
of the TVA and Illinois actions "especially appropriate." Id. at 1229. A portion of a New
Mexico action involving Homestake Mining Corp. was also transferred to the Northern District of Illinois. In re Uranium Industry Antitrust Lit., 466 F.Supp. 958 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979).
A small step was taken towards expediting discovery when the Antitrust Division was
ordered to make all of its investigatory documents in its custody and control available to
Westinghouse and TVA for inspection and copying, subject to whatever conditions Judge
Marshall of the Northern District of Illinois might consider appropriate. In re Grand Jury
Investigation of Uranium Industry, [1978] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 162, 329. Liberal discovery
of Grand Jury transcripts in civil antitrust cases seems likely to continue in the Seventh
Circuit. Unikel, Discovery of Grand Jury Transcripts in Civil Antitrust Cases in the Seventh Circuit: Fair Use or Abuse?, 66 ILL. BAR J. 706 (1978).
130 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., [1976] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) No. 786, at A-4 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 15, 1976).
...See text of part III, infra.
12 In re Uranium Indus. Antitrust Lit., 458 F.Supp. 1223, 1225 (J.P.M.D.L. 1978). The
District Court of Illinois refused to dismiss those counterclaims, and also held that the allegations that Westinghouse misrepresented its uranium supply capacity to utility customers
were sufficient to establish actionable misrepresentation under the Lanham Trademark Act.
In re Uranium Antitrust Lit., 473 F.Supp. 393 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
133 Id.
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615 and thereby terminate a contract for nuclear fuel because unforeseen
delays had made the contract "commercially impracticable."'' The action may signify that most uranium suppliers encounter unforeseen
problems under their contracts.
3.

The New Mexico Litigation

The New Mexico litigation has had an impact beyond its immediate
issues. 135 On December 21, 1975, United Nuclear Corporation (UNC)
brought suit in the District Court of Sante Fe County to obtain a declaratory judgment setting aside or modifying contractual obligations with
General Atomic Company (GAC) with respect to the supply and delivery
of uranium. 13 UNC essentially believes that contract prices were artificially inflated by the Club's activities.3"7 Therefore, UNC seeks to void
the contracts and recover damages in excess of $2 billion. GAC denies
these allegations and is seeking specific performance of the contracts."8s
An action by GAC to interplead UNC and four utilities in the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico was dismissed on
March 2, 1976, for want of subject matter jurisdiction. 139 Three other federal proceedings also were brought by utilities against GAC." 40 A broad
injunction was entered by the Santa Fe court to prevent various actions
by GAC and UNC,' 4 ' but the United States Supreme Court held that
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1976),
1975). General Atomic Co. is a partnership of Gulf Oil Corp.
af'g 400 F.Supp. 888 (N.D. Ill.
and Scallop Nuclear, Inc. Id. at 1265. General Atomic is a named defendant in the New
Mexico litigation. Gulf is a named defendant in the Illinois price-fixing litigation. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., [1976] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 786
at A-3 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 15, 1976).
135 See General Atomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 420 F. Supp. 215, 217 (N. Car. 1976).
136 United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 90 N.M. 97, 99, 560 P.2d 161 (1976). An
amended complaint was filed later to avoid an additional contract on grounds similar to
those set forth in the original complaint. Id. UNC also alleged an attempt to monopolize
and restrain trade in uranium in New Mexico. Id. at 101. Personal jurisdiction was found to
exist. Id. at 102.
137 TIME, supra note 9, at 96.
134

138Id.
" General

Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12 (1977). The four utilities were Duke Power
Co., Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., Detroit-Edison Co., and Commonwealth Edison Co. General Atomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 553 F.2d 53, 55 (10th Cir. 1977). Though GAC might be
subjected to conflicting adjudications, the action failed to qualify as an interpleader procedure because GAC did not have the property to deposit in court and the element of competing claimants was lacking. Id. at 56-57; cf. General Atomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 434 U.S.
12 n.2 (1977).
140 Duke Power Co., Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., and Commonwealth Edison Co.
were the plaintiffs. General Atomic Co. v. Duke Power Co., 434 U.S. 12, 15 (1977).
1..

See id. at 15 n.4.
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such an injunction was not warranted.142 The Sante Fe court modified its
injunction, but the United States Supreme Court reiterated its holding
that no restrictions could be placed upon GAC's assertion of its right to
litigate arbitration claims in federal forums.14 The Sante Fe court injunction was thereby ordered to be vacated or modified.'
In contrast to the proceedings in the Sante Fe court, GAC's motion
on December 9, 1976 to join the Detroit Edison Company as a party 45
was granted by the New Mexico Supreme Court. 4" Other utilities, such as
the Indiana & Michigan Electric Company, have been instructed that
New Mexico was a proper forum in which all issues could be litigated." 7
The New Mexico litigation is important for several reasons. Once the
findings of fact are made, the impact could be devastating in this and
other uranium lawsuits. 48 Furthermore, Judge Felter has clearly indicated that he believes that Gulf tried to conceal documentary evidence by
shipping it to Canada, where it would be protected by the Uranium Information Security Regulations.'4 Exxon Corporation also planned to sue
Gulf and GAC on charges of fraud and antitrust violations concerning a
May, 1973 uranium supply agreement. 150 Should the plaintiffs be relieved
of their contractual obligations, they could receive windfall profits
of up
1 51
to 300 percent if they resell the yellowcake at July, 1978 prices.

',

Id., rev'g 90 N.M. 120, 560 P.2d 541 (1977).
General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U.S. 493 (1978).

144

Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court vacated the Sante Fe Court ruling and opened

12

the way for a possible upset of recent default judgments against GAC in its suit with UNC.
$8 million in damages could give UNC windfall profits of $800 million by reselling the disputed uranium, whereas GAC's potential losses are between $500 and $800 million. Parisi,
General Atomic Names Agent for Arbitration, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1978, §4, at 12, col. 3.
GAC wanted to proceed to arbitration, which UNC opposed. Id. Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1980, at
33, col. 1.
145 United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 91 N.M. 41, 42, 570 P.2d 305, 306
(1977).
146 Id.
at 308.
147

Id.

Parisi, Key Ruling Expected Soon In Uranium Antitrust Suit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2,
1978, at 32, col. 5.
149 Parisi, supra note 1, at 13, col. 1. The regulations are reprinted in Appendices C,
D,
infra. "[T]he federal government's exclusive power over foreign relations does not preclude
the courts of New Mexico from litigating the cartel-related issues presented in this case, or
from seeking the production of documents that will facilitate their resolution of such litigation." United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 49 U.S.L.W. 2177 (829 N.M. S.Ct. 1980).
"5oParisi, Exxon Nuclear in Plan to Sue Gulf on Fraud and Antitrust Charges, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 11, 1978, at 61, col. 5. However, Exxon Nuclear Corporation has been sued in
federal district court in Pittsburgh by Duquesne Light Company, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Ohio Edison Company, and Toledo Edison Company, for failure to meet
its contractual obligation to deliver a "substantial amount of uranium concentrates." Wall
St. J., Sept. 13, 1979, at 33, col. 1.
1561 Parisi, supra note 1, at 13, col. 1.
148
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E. Importance of the Lawsuits
The uranium cartel lawsuits have served to focus world-wide attention on the activities of various multinational corporations, and upon cartels in general. Cartels are becoming increasingly more common. 15 2 A few
hundred multinational corporations will soon dominate world trade, and
these multinationals are often faced with the dilemma of having to obey
conflicting laws of different nations.1 53 From a corporate ethics standpoint, 54 it is apparent that the ethics of one company may conflict with
those of a foreign client.1 55 The uranium litigation may not have a tremendous impact on U.S. law, but it will certainly rekindle ethical debates
and demands that oil companies be required to divest themselves of non56
petroleum-related activities.2
The outcome of the uranium litigation will affect the availability of
uranium, and it is likely that domestic energy demands will affect the
outcome of the litigation. Prior to the Three Mile Island nuclear accident,
though, several sources predicted an increased demand for nuclear energy. 57 As exemplified by the Virginia litigation, many utilities are already involved in uranium raw material activity.5 5 It is doubtful that
these utilities will be awarded "the full measure of their prayers for relief. 1 59 This conclusion recognizes that utilities probably contracted for
uranium to supply the projected number of nuclear power plants, and
that this projection has since dropped dramatically. 6 0 Revised projec152 OPEC is probably the most famous cartel. The Justice Department recently dismissed civil antitrust suits against quinine cartel members. CHEM. & ENGINEERING NEWS,
Nov. 27, 1978, at 16. A fiber cartel may be created. CHEM. & ENGINEERING NEWS, Aug. 7,
1978, at 7; CHEM. WEEK, Nov. 29, 1978, at 30. In contrast, a chemical cartel was recently

found not to be necessary. CHEM. WEEK, June 28, 1978, at 33. The March 28, 1979, nuclear
accident at Three Mile Island near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and accompanying call for
greater nuclear reactor safeguards may slow down such efforts, however. See generally TIME,
April 9, 1979, at 8; TIME, April 16, 1979, at 22; Church, Looking Anew at the Nuclear

Future, TIME, April 16, 1979, at 32.
Maxey, Nuclear Electricity: Bioethical Problems and Priorities, CHEM. ENGINEERAug. 1978, at 27.
"' See Crawford, Multinationals and the Social Contract, CHEM. ENGINEERING PROGRESS, July 1978, at 13.
153

ING PROGRESS,

Maxey, supra note 153, at 26.
TIME, supra note 9, at 98. Many of the arguments for and against divestiture are
explored in articles appearing in CHEM. ENGINEERING PROGRESS, Apr. 1977. See A.M.R.,
Tougher Antitrust Laws, DUN'S REv., March 1979, at 87.
157

See TIME, April 9, 1979, at 8.

"I Stoler, The IrrationalFight Against Nuclear Power, TIME, Sept. 25, 1978, at 71;
TIME, Mar. 27, 1978, at 57; Anderson, Nuclear Energy: A Key Role Despite Problems,
CHEM. & ENGINEERING NEWS, Mar. 7, 1977, at 8; Balzhiser, Energy Options to the Year
2000, CHEM. ENGINEERING, Jan. 3, 1977, at 73.
159 See note 124, supra.
160In

1970, 1000 nuclear plants were predicted to be in operation by the year 2000, but
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tions, combined with licensing and construction delays common to nuclear plants,161 suggest that many utilities would currently be unable to
use the uranium for which they contracted. Of course, the utilities would
be glad to resell the uranium at current market prices and thereby reap a
large profit.
III.
A.

THE ACT OF STATE AND SOVEREIGN COMPULSION DOCTRINES

Development
1.

The Classical Act of State Doctrine.

Though the act of state doctrine appears to be at least 300 years
old,' 6 ' it was not until 1897 that Chief Justice Fuller enunciated the
classic American statement of the doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained
through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves."'3

Fuller's enunciation of the act of state doctrine"" was quickly applied in
antitrust cases. In American Banana v. United Fruit Co.,'65 the plaintiff
and defendant were American corporations. Plaintiff bought a Panamacurrent projections anticipate only 381 nuclear plants to be in operation by that time.
Wechsler, Speeding Up Nuclear Power, DUN'S REV., Feb. 1979, at 93; see Anderson, supra
note 158, at 8. After the problem at Three Mile Island, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
imposed a three-month freeze on the issuance of nuclear licenses and permits. Akron Beacon J., May 22, 1979, §A, at 3, col. 4. Therefore, projections for nuclear plants in operation
by the year 2000 will probably drop even further.
161 INDUS. WEEK, June 20, 1977, at 50; accord Anderson, supra note 158, at 9; cf. TIME,
Sept. 5, 1977, at 30. Such delays sometimes result in lawsuits. Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1976), af'g 400 F.Supp. 888 (N.D. Ill. 1975). Efforts
are being made to speed up the construction of nuclear power plants. TIME, supra, at 30;
TIME, supra note 158, at 57; Long & Murray, 96th Congress expected to be more conservative, thriftier, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Jan. 8, 1979, at 15; Whether such efforts will
be successful depends on Congress. Wechsler, supra note 160, at 93. The March 28, 1979
nuclear accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania and accompanying call for greater
nuclear reactor safeguards are slowing such efforts, however. Akron Beacon J., supra note
160, at 3, col. 4. Moreover, many communities and states will not allow uranium mining.
Mieher, Eastern States Inhibit Search for Uranium, Wall St. J., June 25, 1980, at 13, col. 3.
162 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964); see Annot., 12
A.L.R. Fed. 707, 715 (1972).
163 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
164 The acts of the defendant in Underhill were deemed to be acts of the later-recognized government of Venezuela. Id. at 254.
165 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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nian plantation after the Panama Revolution (1903) resulted in the establishment of an independent state. Defendant United Fruit allegedly encouraged Costa Rican soldiers and officials to seize part of the plantation
and a cargo of supplies. Thus, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
intended to prevent competition and to control and monopolize the banana trade. Plaintiff sought to void a Costa Rican judgment declaring
that the plantation belonged to a third party and not to the plaintiff.'66
Relying on Underhill v. Hernandez,'67 Justice Holmes responded by noting that "a seizure by a state is not a thing that can be complained of
elsewhere in the courts."'6 8 The Court's holding, however, was that the
defendant's actions were not within the scope of the Sherman Act.' The
American Banana holding has since been limited to its particular facts,
and the Sherman Act and other U.S. antitrust laws have thereafter been
17 0
applied to extraterritorial conduct.
In Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Ltd.,' 7' the act of state doctrine
was applied when title to disputed property rested in an American citizen. The United States retroactive recognition of the Carranza Government of Mexico effectively validated the government's expropriation of
property during a Mexican revolt. 7 2 The Supreme Court observed that
an act of one sovereign state within its own boundaries cannot become
the subject of reexamination and modification in the courts of another.
"Such action, when shown to have been taken, becomes, as we have said,
a rule of decision for the courts of this country."'1 3 Therefore, plaintiff's
rights could only be asserted through Mexican courts or the political departments of the U.S. Government.' 4
2.

The Modern Status of the Act of State Doctrine

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino7 5 began the modern era of the
166 Id.
167 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
160 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 350 (1909).

Id. at 349.

Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th
Cir. 1976).
171 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
17 Id. at 309.
173 Id. at 310.
174 Id. at 310. The act of state doctrine was also discussed in a companion case, Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
175 376 U.S. 398 (1964). A limited exception to the Sabbatino Case has been created by
the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C. §2370(e)(2).
See Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 707, 727, (1972); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil
Co., 331 F.Supp. 92, 112 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 950 (1972).
170
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act of state doctrine. 178 The right to proceeds from property which had
been expropriated by the Cuban Government gave rise to the controversy
before the Court. The Court held that the act of state doctrine must be
determined by federal law, and later stated:
Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and allencompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the Judical Branch
will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this
country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law. 177
The policies underlying the act of state doctrine were extensively discussed. The Court determined that the doctrine was compelled by neither
the inherent nature of sovereign authority nor by some principle of international law.178 The doctrine, however, did have "constitutional" underpinnings which arose out of the basic relationships between government
branches in a system of separation of powers. 1 79 "The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably
remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign
acts of state." ' Rather, the Court observed that the applicability of the
act of state doctrine is determined by balancing relevant considerations;
"the less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political
branches."' 8 '
The Sabbatino rationale was affirmatively applied in Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.' s2 In Occidental, the California
District Court provided two reasons for rejecting the plaintiffs' charge
that the defendants had induced and procured assorted executive acts by
foreign states.18 3 Firstly, since the plaintiffs termed the states involved in
this Persian Gulf controversy as co-conspirators, the court concluded that
plaintiffs' questioning of the conduct of these foreign states under the
1'

Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir.

1976).

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964). In the absence of
a request by the Executive Branch, this holding is "reversed" by the Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. §2370. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.Supp. 92,
111 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
178 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964).
177

179 Id. at 423.

180Id.
Id. at 428.

:81

182

331 F.Supp. 92, 112 (C.D. Cal. 1971).

183

Id. at 107.
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antitrust laws was barred by the act of state doctrine. 84 Secondly, the
court decided that plaintiffs' charges that several of Sharjah's acts were
violative of international law were barred by the act of state doctrine, as
enunciated in Sabbatino.8 5 The court then granted the Buttes defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. 8 6
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the act of state
doctrine was revealed in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Republic of

Cuba. 87 The issue was whether Cuba's failure "to return to petitioner
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. (Dunhill), funds mistakenly paid by Dunhill for cigars that had been sold to Dunhill by certain expropriated Cuban cigar businesses was an 'act of state'. ...

"I"'Finding for petitioner,

the Court concluded that with respect to the government's obligation to
return the funds erroneously paid to them, the record did not disclose an
act of state.18 9 There was no public act, such as a statute, decree, order or
resolution of the Cuban Government, which was entitled to respect in
American courts. 90
Four Justices in Dunhill favored the establishment of a commercial
act exception to the act of state doctrine. 19 ' The four Justices felt "that
the mere assertion of sovereignty as a defense to a claim arising out of
purely commercial acts by a foreign sovereign is no more effective if given
the label 'Act of State' than if it is given the label 'sovereign immunity.' "9' Indeed, there were several reasons for establishing a commercial act exception. Firstly, a distinction exists between public-governmental acts and private-commercial acts of sovereign states.' 93 Secondly,
embarrassing conflicts with the Executive Branch would not rise from the
failure to recognize the purely commercial conduct of foreign governments as an act of state."" Thirdly, the Justices believed that the existence of a commercial act exception to the act of state doctrine was con:84

Id. at 110.

186

Id.
Id. at 114.

:87

Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).

181

188
888

Id.
Id.

at 684.
at 690.

Id. at 694-95.
1 Justice Stevens agreed that the act of state doctine did not bar entering judgment
for the petitioner, but he did not concur with part III of the Court's opinion which set forth
the commercial act exception. Id. at 715.
192 Id. at 705.
:90

193 Id. at 693-94.
18, Id. at 697-98, 710. The Department of State, in a letter of Nov. 26, 1975 to the
Solicitor General, reprinted in id. at 706, favored abolishing the act of state doctrine. Id. at
710, 697 n.12.
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sistent with the restrictive approach to sovereign immunity. 195
The dissenting Justices in Dunhill would have held that the intervenor's conduct was an act of state, and that petitioner was not entitled
to an affirmative judgment on its counterclaim for the mistaken payments.'
The dissenters cited several reasons in support of the above
conclusions. Thus, an act of state could be active or passive, and need not
be formalized; 197 and the significance of any letter from the Department
of State was minimal.9 8 Moreover, the doctrines of sovereign immunity
and act of state "differ fundamentally in their focus and in their operation;" 9 9 while a defendant pleading sovereign immunity was exempt by
reason of its status, the act of state doctrine was simply a conflict-of-laws
rule.200 Lastly, the dissenting Justices observed that the validity of a
foreign sovereign's act may be a "political question" not cognizable in
20 1
American courts.
Dunhill has been generally criticized on the grounds that the Court
neither fully understood the act of state doctrine, nor established a strong
course which would provide guidance in the future. 20 2 The commercial act
exception has been met with approval, 20 3 and a merger of sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine "into a rational and comprehensible
204
rule of American foreign relations law" has been requested.
Recent circuit court decisions shed some light on the path which the
act of state doctrine will follow. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, N.T. & S.A., 20 5 the principal action was an antitrust suit in
which plaintiffs alleged that defendants conspired to prevent Timberlane
from milling and exporting Honduran lumber to the United States. Since
the alleged intent and result of the conspiracy was to interfere with the
exportation of lumber to the United States, the foreign commerce of the
United States was directly and substantially affected. 06 In discussing the
action, the district court apparently held that American courts could not
review the acts of the Honduras Government which caused the injuries
'95 Id. at 698-99.
198 Id. at 737. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
187

Id. at 719-20.

:98

Id. at 725.

99 Id.

See id. at 725-26.
Id. at 727.
202 See Golbert & Bradford, The Act of State Doctrine: Dunhill and other Sabbatino
Progeny, 9 Sw. U. L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, The Nonviable Act of State Doctrine: A Change
in the Perception of the Foreign Act of State, 38 U. PIrr. L. REV. 725 (1977).
203 See Golbert & Bradford, supra note 202, at 1, 3; cf. Gordon, The Origin and Development of the Act of State Doctrine, 8 RUT-CAM. L. J. 595 (1977).
200

201

204
205
20

Gordon, supra note 203, at 616.
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 601.
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suffered by Timberlane. This decision was later vacated and remanded
because "there [was] no indication that the actions of the Honduran
court and authorities reflected a sovereign decision that Timberlane's
efforts should be crippled or that trade with the United States should be
restrained."2 07 A critical distinction from Occidental'08 was that
Timberlane named neither Honduras nor any Honduran officer as a defendant or co-conspirator, and that the relations between Honduras and
the United States were
not threatened by any challenge to Honduran pol20 9
icy or sovereignty.
In other circumstances, the act of state doctrine has been held to be
the proper basis for dismissing an antitrust suit before trial.21 0 In Hunt
Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., seven major oil producers and some independent producers, including plaintiff Hunt, agreed to share oil on a proportionate basis if Libyan government action caused a cutback in the oil production of any party to the agreement.2 ' The plaintiff alleged that its
properties were nationalized because the sharing agreement precluded
Hunt from settling with Libya. The defendants also allegedly violated the
Sherman and Wilson Tariff Acts by conspiring to diminish the competition from Libyan crude oil and maintain the competitive advantage of
Persian Gulf crude oil over the Libyan crude.21 2 Though Libya was
named as neither a defendant nor as a co-conspirator, the Libyan expropriations of an alien's property within its boundaries were public acts of
the sovereign. The lower court stated that "Hunt would be required to
establish that but for the conspiracy Libya would not have committed
any of these aggressive actions. '213 The majority of the circuit court accepted that analysis and concluded that the act of state doctrine precluded judicial scrutiny of Libya's political act.2" The majority also noted
that the issue of legality of the foreign sovereign's action cannot be isolated from the issue of that sovereign's motivation and that "Hunt is not
within its [Dunhill]
purely commercial exception and Sabbatino remains
215
unblemished.

It nonetheless seems that the purely commercial act exception,
though not formally law, will be generally accepted as such. At the mini207

208
208

Id. at 608.
461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972).
Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 608 (9th Cir.

1976). The court also used a tripartite test for establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 613-15.
210 Hunt Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73-79 (2d Cir. 1977).
212

Id. at 71.
Id. at 72.

213

Id.

"

284
281

Id. at 73, 76-77.
Id. at 78-79.
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mum, it also seems necessary to preclude naming a foreign sovereign as a
defendant or co-conspirator; however, an individual pleading may raise
the presence of a foreign sovereign such that the act of state doctrine
becomes a viable defense. Judicial discretion and prevailing attitudes at
the time of the decision are criticial because "broad and vague statutory
language has precipitated dealing with international restraints of trade on
a case by case basis. '" 6
3.

Sovereign Compulsion

Sovereign compulsion is a corollary to the act of state doctrine, and
there is no antitrust liability when corporate conduct is compelled by a
foreign sovereign.117 The landmark case in this area is InteramericanRefining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,2 1 8 which was the first case to
clearly hold that sovereign compulsion is a complete defense to an action
under the antitrust laws. 21 9 The plaintiff, Interamerican Refining Corp.,
alleged that the defendants engaged in a boycott designed to prevent
plaintiff from getting the Venezuelan crude oil which plaintiff required
for its operations. 22 0 Since Interamerican produced only for export, it
would violate Venezuela's policy against sales to unnatural markets such
as Canada and Europe. The Venezuelan Government was also hostile toward some of the principal stockholders of Interamerican. The court
therefore concluded that the undisputed facts showed that Venezuelan
2 21
regulatory authorities compelled the boycott.
218 Comment,
The International Reach of United States Antitrust Law and the
Significance of Timberlane Lumber Co. v.Bank of America, 13 U. RICH. L. REv. 149, 151
(1978).
217 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir.
1976).

28
219
220

307 F.Supp. 1291 (Del. 1970).
See id. at 1296.
Id. at 1292.

22 Id. at 1295-96. The court analogized to Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), where
individuals who complied with a state regulatory program were not subjected to antitrust
liability. Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.Supp. 1291, 1298
n.18 (Del. 1970). The act of state doctrine also precluded the court from inquiring into the
validity of the acts of compulsion under Venezuelan laws, and the policies behind the doctrine would not be served by limiting it to acts of expropriation. Id. at 1298-99. The court
also stated:
It requires no precedent, however, to acknowledge that sovereignty includes the
right to regulate commerce within the nation. When a nation compels a trade
practice, firms there have no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the sovereign. The Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction on
United States Courts over acts of foreign sovereigns. By its terms, it forbids only
anticompetitive practices of persons and corporations. Id. at 1298.
This statement apparently means that sovereign compulsion prevents jurisdiction under
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Several authorities supported the InteramericanRefining decision.
The court noted that sovereign compulsion of anticompetitive practices
does not result in restraints of commerce because non-compliance with
22
the foreign sovereign's directives would put an end to commerce.2 The
court also relied on dicta from United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc. 228 and Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.2 24 The Swiss Watch court stated:
If, of course, the defendants' activities had been required by Swiss law,
this court could indeed do nothing. An American court would have under
such circumstances no right to condemn the governmental activity of another sovereign nation. In the present case, however, the defendants' activities were not required by the laws of Switzerland. They were agreeprivately without compulsion on the part of the Swiss
ments formulated
225
Government.
As established in Continental Ore, however, acting in a manner permitted by a foreign sovereign's law does not provide a defense to an antitrust suit 2 26 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' actions in the
trade and commerce of ferrovanadium and vanadium oxide violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, thereby injuring Continental and its
associates.2 27 The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision below and remanded the case for a new trial.228 The plaintiff's fundamental
claim was that the defendants' alleged Sherman Act violations caused or
contributed to the shortage of vanadium oxide.2 29 The Court concluded
that sufficient evidence existed to go to the jury, and then proceeded to
examine the issues raised by Continental's alleged elimination from the
Canadian market. 2 °
In the present case petitioners do not question the validity of any action
taken by the Canadian Government or by its Metals Controller. Nor is
the Sherman Act over the acts of foreign sovereigns. Sovereign compulsion alone is a defense to antitrust liability even if jurisdiction exists. Id. at 1297 n.14. The issue of what
constitutes an act of a foreign sovereign still remains.
222 Id. at 1298, citing K. BREwsTER, ANTrrRusT AND AMERICAN BusiNEss ABROAD 94
(1958).
223 [1963] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified [1965] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 70,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)[hereinafter cited as Swiss Watch]. See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F.Supp. 1291, 1297 n.16 (Del. 1970).
224 370 U.S. 690 (1962). See Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,
307 F.Supp. 1297 n.15 (Del. 1970).
22 Swiss Watch, [1963] TRADE CAs. (CCH) 70,600, at 77,456.
228 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962).
227 Id. at 694-95.
228 Id. at 696.
229 Id. at 697.
220 Id. at 702-08.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

Vol. 12:591

there left in the case any question of the liability of the Canadian Gov[T]he
ernment's agent, for Electro-Met of Canada was not served ....
conspiracy was laid in the United States, was effectuated both here and
conspirabroad, and respondents are not insulated by the fact that their
231
acy involved some acts by the agent of a foreign government.
It was also important that no evidence existed to show that either the
Canadian Government or the Canadian Metals Controller approved or
232
would have approved of the monopolization efforts.
Similarly, governmental approval or government actions taken pursuant to encouragement from private parties do not usually provide a defense for private party defendants in antitrust suits.2 33 In United States
v. Sisal Sales Corp.,23 4 the United States sought an injunction to prevent
further alleged violations of the Sherman and Wilson Tariff Acts. 235 Laws
favorable to the defendants were solicited and secured from the Mexican
and Yucatan Governments. The Court distinguished American Banana
because the Sisal Sales defendants conspired within the United States.
The Court then observed:
The United States complains of a violation of their laws within their own
territory by parties subject to their jurisdiction, not merely of something
done by another government at the instigation of private parties. True,
the conspirators were aided by discriminating legislation, but by their
own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, they brought about forbidden
results within the United States. They are within the jurisdiction of our
courts and may be punished for offenses against our laws.23
To be successful, a defense of sovereign compulsion therefore requires that the defendant have no choice but to comply with the foreign
sovereign's law. It is no defense if the foreign sovereign's law merely allows or approves of the defendant's action.

23 Id. at 706. The Court also found that the defendants were not protected by Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1960), because the defendants were engaged in private commercial activity and not trying to get laws passed or enforced, which would have probably been a constitutionally protected activity. Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707-08 (1962).
...Id. at 706.
213 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir.
1976).
234 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
215 Id. at 271.
216 Id. at 276. This statement apparently implies that mere acts "done by another government at the instigation of private parties" cannot be reviewed by U.S. courts.
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B. Current Status of the Act of State and Sovereign Compulsion
Doctrines.
The act of state and sovereign compulsion doctrines are but two of
several related defenses in the antitrust field. 237 The critical elements of
the act of state doctrine require that: there be an act by a foreign state
which is fully executed within the territory of the foreign state.23 8 The
U.S. courts have discretion since the act of state doctrine is a conflict of
laws rule. Thus, when they follow the doctrine, they ultimately choose not
237 In the domestic arena, the state action doctrine established by Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), and its progeny exempted governmentally imposed restraints of trade from
the Sherman Act. See Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United
States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 128 (1967); Baker, Antitrust Remedies Against
Government-Inspired Boycotts, Shortages, and Squeezes: Wandering on the Road to
Mecca, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 911, 916 (1976); Note, Immunities to ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Antitrust Law, 12 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 487, 506 (1978).
If the state action doctrine is viewed as parallel to the act of state doctrine, then the
corollary of governmental compulsion parallels the doctrine of sovereign compulsion. The
degree of compulsion is critical; state supervision or approval will not exempt defendants
who violate the Sherman Act. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 733 (1975);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). See Baker, supra, at 619; Baker, Antitrust Conflicts between Friends: Canadaand the United States in the Mid-1970's, 11 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 165, 177 n.67 (1978); Note, Application of ExtraterritorialImmunities, 12
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 487, 507 (1977); Atwood, InternationalJoint Ventures and the U.S.
Antitrust Laws, 10 AKRON L. REv. 609, 621 n.48 (1977).
The defense of sovereign immunity also exists in foreign commerce cases, but is not yet
relevant in the uranium cartel litigation because foreign governments are not parties to the
litigation; if they were, they could invoke the sovereign immunity defense and be exempt
due to their status as a legal entity. See Baker, supra, 61 CORNELL L. REv.at 918; Graziano,
supra, at 118; Kitner & Griffin, Jurisdictionover Foreign Commerce under the Sherman
Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 199, 227 (1977); Joelson & Griffin, The Legal Status of
Nation-State Cartels Under United States Antitrust and Public InternationalLaw, 9
INT'L LAW. 617, 622 (1975).
238 See part III.A of text and accompanying footnotes, supra. Each of these elements
presents definitional problems. The legislative, executive, and judicial branches of a government may perform an "act." See Note, supra note 202, at 725, 738. The foreign state must
be recognized by our Executive. Id. The four generally accepted elements of statehood ((1) a
permanent population, (2) a defined territory, (3) a government, and (4) the capacity to
enter into relations with other states) are also the source of definitional problems. See Convention on Rights and Duties of States, December 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881;
Maser, Sovereignty and Canada:an Examination of Canadian Sovereignty from a Legal
Perspective, 42 SASK. L. REv. 1, 2, 3 n.6 (1978).
To resolve the remaining issues, it is necessary to determine whether the act in question
is fully executed or completed, and what constitutes the territory of the foreign state.
Apparently, the distinction between "foreign-party" cases, in which the foreign sovereign was an actual party to the litigation, and "foreign-non-party" cases, in which the foreign sovereign's acts were only questioned collaterally in litigation between private parties,

has been abolished. 3 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 133 (1973).
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to pass upon the validity of the foreign sovereign's act."' 9
In contrast, the doctrine of sovereign compulsion is a theory distinct
from the act of state doctrine. Sovereign compulsion currently provides a
complete defense to an action under U.S. antitrust laws. 40 That position
will most likely be changed, however, because the Department of Justice
clearly opposes the InteramericanRefining decision.2 4 1 The problem with
Interamerican Refining is that the foreign sovereign effectively implemented a boycott against the United States. The foreign state therefore
exceeded its territorial sovereignty.2 42 As with the act of state doctrine,
however, it is important to distinguish between extraterritorial action and
2 43
the extraterritorial effect of an internal action.
Two changes will likely affect both the act of state and sovereign
compulsion doctrines. A commercial act exception will probably gain acceptance in the act of state area,2 44 and could also be extended to sovereign compulsion cases. 2 4 5 This exception will probably be limited to
purely commercial acts,2 46 at least in the immediate future. The other
change will provide greater flexibility in the act of state and sovereign
compulsion doctrines by using a balancing approach,2 47 even though such
239 See Note, Jurisdiction-Extra-Territorial
Application of the Sherman and Clay-

ton Antitrust Acts-Act of State Doctrine-InducingForeign Acts Which Have an Anticompetitive Effect on United States Commerce, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 317 (1972).
20 See Interamerican Refining, 307 F.Supp. 1296 (Del. 1970).
214 ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, [1977] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
266, Part II [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GuIDE]; [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) T799, at E-1; see Seki, The Justice Department'sNew Antitrust Guide for International Operations-aSummary and Evaluation,32 Bus. LAW. 1633, 1646 (1977); Rosenthal,
The Antitrust Perspective, 12 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 263, 266 n.1 (1978); Baker, supra note

237, 11

CORNELL INT'L L. J. 177 n.66.
242 See Rosenthal, supra note 241, at 266; Baker, supra note 237, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.

J. 177 n.66.
242 Joelson & Griffin, supra note 237, at 634.
24 See Dunhill, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), notes 194-207 and accompanying text supra;
Timberlane, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), notes 208-12 and accompanying text supra; Joelson & Griffin, supra note 237, at 634; Golbert & Bradford, supra note 202, at 34 nn.159-60;
Atwood, supra note 237, at 621 n.48; Baker, supra note 237, 11 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 177 n.66,
Davidow, Recent Developments in InternationalAntitrust, 10 AKRON L. REV. 603, 608
(1977); contra Note, supra note 202, at 750-53.
245 Joelson & Griffin, supra note 237, at 634.
240 See notes 244-45 supra. The commercial act exception is also gaining importance
domestically. See City of Layfayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
Finally, the Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602-11 (1976) reflects the
trend to reach commercial activity. See Golbert & Bradford, supra note 202, at 42; Comment, supra note 216, at 160.
247 Balancing the relevant considerations was important in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See notes 175-81 and accompanying text supra. See also
Timberlane, 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976); Amon, Act of State Doctrine, 12 VA. J. INT'L
L. 413, 422 n.44 (1972).
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an approach may no longer be predictable. A broad spectrum of suggested
approaches in the act of state area ranges from applying a "rule of reason" 2481to a three-pronged analysis which still prevents imposing U.S. values upon independent foreign states. 249 In the sovereign compulsion area,
"a broad 'reasonableness inquiry' that focuses upon principles of international law and traditional equity" 250 rather than on the restraint of trade

theory could be employed. Both changes are likely to be met by some
opposition, but they would seem to be beneficial due to the large amount
of commerce which flows between nations and the increasing amount of
government activity in commerce. 251
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE

ACT

OF STATE AND SOVEREIGN COMPULSION

DOCTRINES TO THE URANIUM CARTEL LITIGATION

The act of state and sovereign compulsion doctrines may play a major role in the defendants' strategy in the Illinois antitrust litigation and
in all discovery procedures involving documents abroad which the parties
may request. Since the Virginia breach of contract litigation has apparently been concluded prior to the Illinois antitrust litigation,2 5 2 Westinghouse will not have the opportunity to invoke an act of state or sovereign
compulsion defense.2 53 The invocation of these defenses elsewhere in the
245

Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in An International Teapot, 8 COR-

NELL INT'L L. J. 16, 39 (1975).
249 Note, supra note 202, at

757. The first prong consists of "the needs and practices of
the international system." Id. The second prong is "the fundamental public policy of the
forum." Id. at 758. The third prong is "the interest of the forum in the dispute." Id. at 759.
This third prong is also a balance, and weighs the interests of the United States against
those of the foreign state. Id. at 760.
250 Note, InternationalLaw-Extraterritoriality-Antitrust
Law-Development of the
Defense of Sovereign Compulsion, 69 MicH. L. REV. 888, 905 (1971). Seven representative
factors are suggested in determining whether to apply the doctrine of sovereign compulsion:
(1) the impact of the compelled activity upon U.S. foreign policy; (2) the scope of the foreign government's directive; (3) the degree of the compulsion, which includes how much of
the activity was compelled and what sanctions would have been imposed for noncompliance;
(4) the impact of the compelled activity upon U.S. economic policy; (5) the quantitative and
qualitative impact of the compelled activity upon competition and commerce; (6) the nationality of the defendant; and (7) the defendant's prior knowledge of the restraint. Id. at
905-09.
251 See generally Baker, supra note 237, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 911.
252 Hymowitz, supra note 100, at 1, col. 6. See notes 123 & 129 and accompanying te t,
supra.
252 Westinghouse wanted the Illinois proceedings to be given precedence over the Virginia proceedings and hoped to use the discovery obtained in the Virginia litigation in the
Illinois litigation. Re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. and Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273,
289-90 (High Ct. Justice 1977). However, if Westinghouse had succeeded in establishing an
act of state or sovereign compulsion defense, with the foreign government's activity resulting in the increase in uranium prices and ending in "commercial impracticability" of the
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uranium cartel litigations, however, would provide an opportunity for
U.S. courts to analyze the defenses and clarify the status of the act of
state and sovereign compulsion doctrines. Perhaps U.S. courts should refuse to hear these and
similar matters because they raise nonjusticiable
"political questions."2'5 Unfortunately, such an abdication would make it
even more difficult to obtain impartial judgments to innately sensitive
problems.
A.

The Illinois Antitrust Litigation

Antitrust litigation is usually complex, and the Illinois litigation
should be no exception. The defendants, 255 like Gulf, undoubtedly feel
that they have not violated U.S. antitrust laws. 25 6 After being contacted
by the Canadian Government, GMCL and Gulf consulted attorneys with
regard to the Canadian Combines Act and U.S. antitrust laws.2 57 They

concluded that there was "Canadian Government direction and no likelihood of substantial impact on foreign commerce of the United States' 2 "
(emphasis added). Unfortunately for the defendants, these conclusions
were erroneous because there was a substantial impact on U.S. commerce
even though the Club intended to exclude the U.S. market from its pricefixing.259 It seems likely that there were antitrust violations, and the issue
to be resolved is whether the defendants were exempt from U.S. antitrust
laws. It will probably be difficult to obtain a proper result due to various
foreign laws which impede discovery. 260
1. Application of the Act of State Doctrine
At least two of the necessary elements for a Canadian act of state
uranium contracts, Westinghouse would then have had no antitrust suit in Illinois. Another
Westinghouse option would have been to argue that its contract rights for uranium, rather
than the uranium itself, were expropriated. Cf. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 413 (1964).
GAC may attempt to invoke an act of state or sovereign compulsion defense in the New
Mexico litigation, but the critical application of those doctrines will occur if they are raised
in the discovery proceedings.
24 See Golber & Bradford, supra note 202, at 40.
255 See note 125 supra.
255 See Gulf Position Paper,

supra note 35, at 23. Gulf and GMCL have pleaded the act
of state, sovereign compulsion, and Noerr doctrines as affirmative defenses, while other defendants have merely pleaded the act of state and sovereign compulsion defenses. Comment,
The InternationalUranium Cartel:Litigation and Legal Implications, 19 TEXAs INTL' L. J.
59, 90 nn.142-43, 145 (1979).
257 Gulf Position Paper, supra note 35, at 2; see IUC Hearings, supra note 4, pt. 2, at
187.
25 Gulf Position Paper, supra note 35, at 2.
259 See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
20 See part IV. B. infra.
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appear to have been exercised. Canada is a foreign state, and the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Regulations amendment of August 2, 1972261
should be considered a Canadian act. Participation by the defendants
prior to August 2, 1972 would arguably be exempted from U.S. antitrust
laws under the sovereign compulsion defense. 28 2 Several considerations
must be examined, however, because the Canadian act was not fully executed within Canadian territory. Moreover, the policy underlying the Canadian act appears to be purely commercial, and therefore brings that act
within the growing exception to the act of state doctrine.
Canada and the Canadian uranium consuming countries began a dialogue in 1970 to discuss uranium marketing problems. 23 In early 1972,
private Canadian producers and officials of two Canadian Crown Corporations were authorized to attend meetings concerning these problems. 2"
The Canadian government was informed of and approved the marketing
arrangements negotiated by Canadian uranium producers and supported
the arrangement in Canada by issuing a regulation under section 9 of the
Atomic Energy Control Act.... The initial Direction of August, 1972

was revised
on several occasions as prices recovered from their distressed
2 65
levels.

Canada rubber-stamped the price-fixing arrangements negotiated by the
uranium producers, but such a formality should not constitute an act of
state. The essence of the act was determined and effectively exercised
outside Canadian territory. 2 " To extend a sovereign's territory to include
that of its "co-conspirators" would undermine many legal concepts of
2, Atomic Energy Control Regulations Amendment P.C. 1972-1719, STAT. 0. & R. 72301 (1972), reprintedin Appendix B, infra.
" See part IV.A.2, infra.
63 CANADN BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 40, at 11.
2" Id. at 12.
265 Id. This raises the issue of whether the defendants were engaged in private commercial activity or were trying to get laws passed, which would probably constitute a constitutionally protected activity under Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1960). The grant of immunity to parties seeking foreign political action
used to be uncertain. Amon, supra note 247, at 417. The Department of Justice now generally accepts the Noerr doctrine as protecting parties seeking foreign political action. ArmTRusT GumE, supra note 241, at 266; Seki, supra note 241, at 1647. The Canadian Government initiated a discussion of international uranium marketing problems, but apparently
did not then implement price-fixing. See note 270 and accompanying text, infra. The Noerr
doctrine should not apply to the uranium cartel antitrust or discovery litigation because the
initial price-fixing act occurred prior to the issuance of The Atomic Energy Control Regulations Amendment P.C. 1972-1719, STAT. 0. & R. 72-301 (issued July 27, 1972), and in all
cases would serve as a shield for what might otherwise be an unlawful conspiracy. The
plaintiffs should at least be given the opportunity to prove the unlawful conspiracy. Accord,
Amon,supra note 247, at 418 n.21.
2 See notes 18, 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
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sovereignty and territoriality.
The August 23, 1972, statement of the Honourable Donald S. MacDonald, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, lends credence to the
possibility that the Canadian act may have been purely commercial:
In order to stabilize the current uranium marketing situation and
to promote the development of the Canadian uranium industry, I have
today issued a Direction to the Atomic Energy Control Board covering
such aspects as minimum selling prices and volumes of sales to export
markets. Because of the nature of uranium export contracts it would not
be in the public interest to disclose further contract details at this time 6'7
(emphasis added).
Thus, despite Canada's belief that the international uranium marketing
arrangement was in the Canadian national interest, ' s8 and its broad policy for controlling uranium and atomic energy, 26s it would seem that the
act of state doctrine is inapplicable in the Illinois antitrust litigation.
2.

Application of the Sovereign Compulsion Doctrine

The defense of sovereign compulsion is only available if the prohibited actions were compelled by the foreign sovereign; mere authorization
or approval is insufficient. In the Illinois litigation it is unclear whether
sovereign compulsion actually existed.
The Canadian Government did initiate discussion of international
uranium marketing problems, 27 0 and the defendants undoubtedly felt
compelled to participate in the Club.2 1 Evidence of Canadian compulsion
may be found in three telexes '7 2 to the GMCL manager "advising him
that it was in the national interest of Canada for him to participate in the
meetings. 2 7 3 In addition, in referring to the reason for the passage of the
Uranium Information Security Regulations, the Honourable Alastair W.
Gillespie stated that the actions of the Canadian uranium producers were
required by Canadian law and taken pursuant to Canadian policy.27 4 But
Reprinted in Gulf Position Paper, supra note 35, at 2.
See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
"' See note 117 supra.
270 See note 263 and accompanying text supra.
'1 See note 259 and accompanying text supra;see IUC Hearings,supra note 4, pt.2, at
187; note 80 supra; Gulf Position Paper, supra note 35, at 1, 2; IUC Hearings,supra note 4,
at 185-86.
272 IUC Hearings, supra note 4, at 308.
171 Id. at 157-58 (statement of Mr. O'Hara); see also id. at 95 (statement of Mr.
Jackson).
267
28

Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 8. Only one isolated statement mentions
that the Canadian Government specifically requested some Canadian producers to act.
174

Statement of A.W. Gillespie of Sept. 22, 1976, reprintedin Gulf Position Paper, supra note
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there appears to be no Canadian law applicable to international uranium
marketing prior to August 2, 1972.15
On the other hand, Canadian approval of the Club's activities is undisputed,276 and if this position were distinct from the compulsion argument, the defense of sovereign compulsion could be allowed. Defendants
often interpret statements of approval to indicate compulsion, however,
and although compulsion may have occurred orally, the tangible evidence
supporting such a position is weak.
"Obviously the statement made in 1969 [of Mr. Lang] is not in and of
itself compulsion to undertake an action in 1972. '277 The necessary compulsion should have occurred in 1972. In light of GMCL's anticipated entry into the uranium market, the Canadian telexes requested GMCL to
"take every reasonable step to ensure compliance" and later "make every
effort to adhere to the common terms" of the informal world producers'
arrangement because all Canadian producers "should" participate in order for the arrangement to be workable.2 7 8 Even the Honourable Alastair

W. Gillespie stated that the Canadian Government authorized a temporary marketing arrangement. "The government approved this arrangement in 1972, on the specific understanding that it would not apply to the
markets of Canada, Australia, South Africa, France and the United
States.1'27 9 On its face, such language does not indicate compulsion. Based

on the available information, it does not appear that the sovereign compulsion defense is available in the Illinois antitrust litigation.
B. The Discovery Issues
The non-production of records in the uranium cartel litigation may
seriously impede a just resolution of the issues. Superficially, such a result
reflects the "winning" nature of the adversary system, but a closer examination reveals that liberal discovery is favored in U.S. jurisprudence. In
this regard, Societe Internationale v. Rogers280 provides landmark law
when analyzing the non-production of records on the grounds that their
production would violate foreign law. The act of state and sovereign com35, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Gillespie Statement].
'75 Accord, Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 1.
276See note 265 and accompanying text supra.

IUC Hearings,supra note 4, pt.2, at 116 (statement of Mr. Jackson). See Canadian
Uranium Policy Statement, supra note 35, at 7.
IUC Hearings,supra note 4, pt.2, at 308.
' Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 1. Accord, Baker, supra note 237, 11 CoRNELL INT'L L. J. 183 n.94.
-0 357 U.S. 197 (1958). The discovery issues are partially explored in notes 116-20,
supra. A complete discussion of Societe Internationaleand its progeny is beyond the scope
of this note.
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pulsion doctrines may also provide alternative grounds for the failure to
produce documents. 28 1
Several nations have passed legislation intended to protect business
records located with their jurisdicton. 282 The growing trend is to prevent
foreign powers from conducting antitrust investigations,2'" as evidenced
by the legislation passed in Australia, Canada, France, and South Africa.284 "International co-operation in the field of cartel law is therefore,
to say the least, very imperfect and in particular does less than justice to
'2 5
the claims of the United States in recognition of its Antitrust Laws.
The above problem is confronted by the existence of two conflicting
policies. One policy exists because some nations place the principle of
freedom of contract above that of freedom of competition. 2s8 These countries desire to protect their own sovereignty, and might object to the generally recognized principles of procedural law.287 The express purpose of
the Uranium Information Security Regulations was "to protect the sovereignty of Canada in the face of extraterritorial application of U.S. legal
processes '288 on the grounds that "[flailure to take such action would
have placed the government in the untenable position of allowing evidence to be provided to a foreign court for use in the possible prosecution
of nationals for acts that were in accordance with Canadian law and government policy" 289 (emphasis added). The conflicting policy surfaces
when examining the United States desire for justice.
What is disturbing about this crop of "business records" laws is that
they are being used to prevent the United States from even investigating
281 This would appear to be an original use for these existing defenses. See Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Urangesellschaft, 480 F.Supp. 1138 (N.D. M11.
1970).
282 See Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Limits Imposed by InternationalLaw on the Application of Cartel Law, 5 INT'L LAw. 279, 297 (1971).
282 Baker, supra note 237, 11 CoRNuL INT'L L. J. at 185.
284 See Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 10. See generally Baker, supra note
237, 11 CORNSL INT'L L. J. 186. See generally Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain
Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121, amended Foreign Proceedings Act, 1976, No. 202 (AustL), as
implemented by Order of the Attorney General, Austl. Gov't Gaz. No. S.214 (Nov. 29, 1976);
Uranium Information Security Regulations, STAT. 0. & R. 77-836, 111 Can. Gaz., pt. IH, at
4619 (1977), amending STAT. 0. & R. 76-644, 110 Can. Gaz., pt. II, at 2747 (1976)(Can.);
Atomic Energy Act, 1967, No. 90,330, 15 Stat. Repub. So. Afr. 1045 (1977)(So. Aft.). See
also Cheeseright, RTZ Stands in the Shade, Financial Times (London), Nov. 8, 1977, at
cols. 3, 7; Recent Development, Antitrust: AustralianRestrictions on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 20 HARv. INT'L L. J. 663 (1979).
28' Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 282, at 289.
288 Id. at 288.
287 Id. at 295-96. Mr. Seidl-Hohenveldern also objects strenuously to "fishing expedi-

tions" for documents. Id.
288 Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 7, 10.
288 Id.
at 8. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
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whether a violation of its laws may have taken place. The result is political outrage and frustration in the United States. It is also likely to result
in more haphazard and uneven law enforcement .... As a result, trials
may 290
be shorter but decisions less just. No lawyer can take pride in
that.
Some individuals have suggested that a balancing approach may be necessary to resolve the discovery issues:
[T]he question this [House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce] must decide is whether the disclosure better serves the purposes
of American people, the U.S. national interest, or whether we achieve a
greater benefit for the American people through adhering to the request
of the Government of Canada, which is requesting this treatment not
only as a sovereign power within itself but also as a participant in a
commercial venture. Therefore, we have a split role for the Government
of Canada 2' 1 (emphasis added).
A memorandum prepared for the House Committee Hearings by the
Library of Congress may best summarize the recent trend of law: when
dealing with antitrust matters which are vital to the U.S. economic policy,
29 2
foreign non-disclosure laws do not significantly restrain disclosure.
1.

Application of the Act of State Doctrine

The Uranium Information Security Regulations were enacted to protect Canadian sovereignty in the face of extraterritorial reach of the U.S.
antitrust laws. 293 The elements of an act of state defense would therefore
prevent disclosure of business records within Canada's jurisdiction. Basically, three problems exist as regards such disclosure. First, documents in
the United States may have been shipped to Canada solely to prevent
discovery. Though such behavior should be disallowed, it would be difficult to prove. The second problem is that the defendants may raise a
Noerr issue, but if their purpose was merely to hide unlawful activity,
this should also be disallowed.2 " The third problem is that Canada participated in a commercial venture and this action could fall within the
developing commercial act exception to the act of state doctrine.2 95 A primary danger of acquiescing to a Canadian act of state with regard to the
290 Baker, supra note 237, 11 CoRSNE= I'NTL L. J. 187. See also note 106 and accompanying text supra.
291 IUC Hearings,supra note 4, at 50 (statement of Mr. Moss).
292 Id. at 51 (statement of Mr. McLain).

93 Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 7, 10; Gillespie Statement, supra note 274,
at 17.

294 See note 265 supra.
295 See note 291 and accompanying text supra.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

Vol. 12:591

Uranium Information Security Regulations is that the United States
might be contributing to the development of international law which
would hinder its antitrust investigations.19
2.

Application of the Sovereign Compulsion Doctrine

Multinational corporations may find themselves in a position of trying to satisfy conflicting laws when faced with foreign laws compelling the
defendants to restrain from producing business records or information
pertaining to the Club's activities. Sovereign compulsion might arguably
constitute a valid excuse for complying with foreign non-disclosure laws.
This defense is confronted by the same three problems which were present with the application of the act of state doctrine in this area. Firstly,
the documents might have been shipped to the foreign country solely to
prevent discovery. Secondly, the Noerr defense will be disallowed if the
laws were enacted to hide unlawful activity. Thirdly, the commercial act
2
exception is raised by Canada's participation in a commercial venture. 7
In addition, there are problems of international comity, sovereignty, extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, and differing legal and
economic policies. Since the defense of sovereign compulsion creates more
problems than answers, it would seem preferable to seek a diplomatic
solution.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although foreign countries have not been made parties to the uranium cartel litigation, their role is critical to the outcome of the lawsuits.
If the Club had followed its prescribed intent and not affected U.S. commerce, it is doubtful that litigation would have ensued. The defendants
correctly realized that participating in a cartel might be acceptable if U.S.
commerce were not affected.298
The Club's activities have cost American consumers a great deal of
money. The very purpose of the U.S. antitrust laws is to protect domestic
consumers 299 and these consumers deserve to be protected. 00 In any
event, the parties to the antitrust litigation should share the primary liability. Westinghouse should not have sold uranium which it did not have,
and the defendants who participated in the Club should have requested
an exemption from U.S. antitrust laws prior to acting. 0 1 Perhaps a settle29
29
298
2

Cf. Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 282.
See text of part IV. A. 1 and accompanying notes supra.
Accord, Antitrust Memorandum, supra note 81.
Baker, supra note 248, at 40-41.

300

Rosenthal, supra note 241, at 1638.

301 It is curious to note, however, that a Canadian doctrine similar to the U.S. state
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ment could be reached whereby the Illinois antitrust defendants relieve
Westinghouse of some of its liability in the Virginia breach of contract
litigation.
The U.S. consumer would clearly be harmed if multinational corporations were prevented from doing business in several countries. However,
consumers would also be harmed if international relations deteriorated. If
no settlement can be reached in the uranium cartel litigation, the U.S.
courts should at least attempt to clarify the current status of the act of
state and sovereign compulsion doctrines.

action doctrine was the basis for providing an exemption to the Canadian antitrust law, the
Combines Investigation Act. Even so, a formal inquiry under that Act is taking place to
determine ff the international marketing arrangement violated the Act. Gillespie Press Release, supra note 38, at 7-8.
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A

Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code states:
Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation and
subject to the preceding section on substituted performance:
(a) Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller who

complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a
contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable
by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a
basic assumption on which the contract was made or by compliance in
good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.
(b) Where the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part of
the seller's capacity to perform, he must allocate production and deliveries among his customers but may at his option include regular customers not then under contract as well as his own requirements for further
manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner which is fair and
reasonable.
(c) The seller must notify the buyer seasonably that there will be delay
or non-delivery and, when allocation is required under paragraph (b), of
the estimated quota thus made available for the buyer.
Comment 4 to section 2-615 states:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in
cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in
itself a justification, for that is exactly the type of business risk which
business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as
war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of
supply or the like, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this section. (See Ford & Sons,
Ltd. v. Henry Leetham & Sons, Ltd., 21 Com. Cas. 55 (1915, K.B.D.).)
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Registration
No.
Date
SOR/72-301 2 August, 1972
ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL AcT

Atomic Energy Control Regulations,
amendment
P.C. 1972-1719 27 July, 1972
His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, pursuant to section 9 of the Atomic Energy Control Act, is pleased hereby to approve the
annexed amendment, made by the Atomic Energy Control Board on the
19th day of July, 1972, to the Atomic Energy Control Regulations
approved by Order in Council P.C. 1960-348 of 17th March, 1960,1 as
amended, 2 in accordance with the Schedule hereto.
SCHEDULE

1. Section 201 of the Atomic Energy Control Regulations is
amended by adding thereto the following subsection:
"(2) A permit to export prescribed substances shall not be granted
unless the Board is satisfied that the prices stipulated for, and the quantities of, the prescribed substance proposed to be exported meet such criteria, if any, respecting price levels and quantities as may be specified in
the public interest in a direction given to the Board by the Minister."

1

STAT.

'STAT.

0. & R. 60-119, 94 Can. Gaz., pt. H (April 13, 1960).
0. & R. 64-458, 98 Can. Gaz., pt. H (Nov. 25, 1964).
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APPENDIX C

Registration
SOR/76-644 23 September, 1976
ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL ACT

Uranium Information Security Regulations
P.C. 1976-2368 21 September, 1976
His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, pursuant to section 9 of the Atomic Energy Control Act, is pleased hereby to approve the
annexed Regulations respecting the security of uranium information
made by the Atomic Energy Control Board.
REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE SECURITY OF
URANIUM INFORMATION

Short Title
1. These Regulations may be cited as the Uranium Information
Security Regulations.
Security of Information
2. No person who has in his possession or under his control any
note, document or other written or printed material in any way related to
conversations, discussions or meetings that took place between January 1,
1972 and December 31, 1975 involving that person or any other person or
any government, crown corporation, agency or other organization in respect of the production, import, export, transportation, refining, possession, ownership, use or sale of uranium or its derivatives or compounds,
shall
(a) release any such note, document or material, or disclose or communicate the contents thereof to any person, government, crown corporation, agency or other organization unless
(i) he is required to do so by or under a law of Canada, or
(ii) he does so with the consent of the Minister of Energy,
Mines and Resources; or
(b) fail to guard against or take reasonable care to prevent the unauthorized release of any such note, document or material on the disclosure or
communication of the contents thereof.
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Registration
SOR/77-836

14 October, 1977

ATOMIC ENERGY

CONTROL ACT

Uranium Information Security Regulations
P.C. 1977-2923 13 October, 1977
His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, pursuant to section 9 of the Atomic Energy Control Act, is pleased hereby to approve the
revocation of the Uranium Information Security Regulations approved by
Order in Council P.C. 1976-2368 of 21st September, 19761 and to approve,
in substitution therefor, the annexed Regulations respecting the security
of uranium information made by the Atomic Energy Control Board.
REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE SECURITY OF
URANIUM INFORMATION

Short Title
1. These Regulations may be cited as the Uranium Information
Security Regulations.
Interpretation
2. In these Regulations, "foreign tribunal" includes any court or
grand jury and any person authorized or permitted under foreign law to
take or receive evidence whether on behalf of a court or grand jury or
otherwise.
Security of Information
3. No person who has in his possession or under his control any
note, document or other written or printed material in any way related to
conversations, discussions or meetings that took place between January 1,
1972 and December 31, 1975 involving that person or any other person in
relation to the eiporting from Canada or marketing for use outside
Canada of uranium or its derivatives or compounds shall
I See

Appendix C.
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(a) release any such note, document or material or disclose or communicate the contents thereof to any person, foreign government or branch
or agency thereof or to any foreign tribunal unless
(i) he is required to, do so by or under a law of Canada, or
(ii) he does so with the consent of the Minister of Energy,
Mines and Resources; or
(b) fail to guard against or take reasonable care to prevent the unauthorized release of any such note, document or material or the disclosure or
cumminication of the contents thereof.
Application
4. Section 3 does not apply to a person unless he has such possession or control by reason of the direct or indirect acquisition by him of
the note, document or material because of his being or having been
(a) engaged in the mining, exporting, refining or selling of uranium or
its derivatives or compounds;
(b) appointed to a public office or appointed by a Minister pursuant to
subsection 37 (1) of the Public Service Employment Act or employed in
the Public Service; or
(c) a director, an officer, employee or agent of
(i) a person engaged as described in paragraph (a),
(ii) a company incorporated in Canada that is or was a parent,
subsidiary or affiliate of or related to another company incorporated in Canada so engaged or to a foreign corporation so engaged; or
(iii) the Atomic Energy Control Board, Eldorado Nuclear Limited or Uranium Canada, Limited.
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, states:
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; exception of resale price
agreements; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal: Provided, That nothing contained in sections 1 to 7 of this title shall render illegal, contracts or
agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity
which bears, or the label or container of which bears, the trademark,
brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such commodity and
which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions,
under any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale is to be
made, or to which the commodity is to be transported for such resale, and
the making of such contracts or agreements shall not be an unfair method
of competition under section 45 of this title: Provided further, That the
preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract or agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices on
any commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or
between retailers, or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other. Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination of conspiracy declared by sections 1 to 7 of this title
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or
by imprisonment not exceeding fifty thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments; in the discretion of the court.
0

Section 1 of the Sherman Act has since been amended as follows:

§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by
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imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
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Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 28 Stat. 570 (1894), as amended, 15
U.S.C. 8, states:

§ 8. Trusts in restraint of import trade illegal; penalty
Every combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or contract is declared to be contrary to public policy, illegal, and void when the same is
made by or between two or more persons or corporations, either of whom,
as agent or principal, is engaged in importing any article from any foreign
country into the United States, and when such combination, conspiracy,
trust, agreement, or contract is intended to operate in restraint of lawful
trade, or free competition in lawful trade or commerce, or to increase the
market price in any part of the United States of any article or articles
imported or intended to be imported into the United States, or of any
manufacture into which such imported article enters or is intended to
enter. Every person who shall be engaged in the importation of goods or
any commodity from any foreign country in violation of this section, or
who shall combine or conspire with another to violate the same, is guilty
of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof in any court of the United
States such person shall be fined in a sum not less than $100 and not
exceeding $5,000, and shall be further punished by imprisonment, in the
discretion fo the court, for a term not less than three months nor exceeding twelve months.

